Restoring the Founders\u27 Ideal of the Independent Jury in Criminal Cases by Regnier, Thomas
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 51 | Number 3 Article 2
1-1-2011
Restoring the Founders' Ideal of the Independent
Jury in Criminal Cases
Thomas Regnier
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Regnier, Restoring the Founders' Ideal of the Independent Jury in Criminal Cases, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 775 (2011).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol51/iss3/2
RESTORING THE FOUNDERS' IDEAL OF THE
INDEPENDENT JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Thomas Regnier*
In your paper of April 29th [1779] I find an attack upon
Juries, the first that ever was made upon them in a free
country. I wish the author of that publication would
speak out, and tell us at once that he means and wishes
that Juries should be abolished as troublesome restraints
upon our rulers . .
INTRODUCTION
John Hodges was an official of the town of Upper
Marlborough, Maryland, during the War of 1812.2 During
the British retreat from Washington, D.C., citizens from
Hodges's town took into custody four British stragglers and a
deserter.3 The incensed British then took hostages from the
town and threatened to "lay the town in ashes" if the
prisoners were not returned by noon the next day.4 Hodges
persuaded the American general who held the prisoners to
allow them to be returned to the British, thus saving the town
and its people from destruction.'
A happy ending for the town, but not for Hodges. The
U.S. Government prosecuted him for treason for giving aid
* Adjunct Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois;
Judicial Law Clerk to Hon. Harry Leinenweber, U.S. District Court, N.D.
Illinois. LL.M., Columbia Law School; J.D., University of Miami School of Law.
Special thanks to Philip Hamburger, Akhil Amar, Marzi Kaplan, Robert K.
Jones, David Luck, and Robert G. Clarke for advice or inspiration. Thanks also
to members of the faculties of Columbia Law School and Chicago-Kent College
of Law who critiqued a presentation of this article.
1. Letter, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, May 4, 1779.
2. The Trial of John Hodges, 10 Am. St. Tr. 163, 163-65 (C.C.D. Md. 1815).
3. Id. at 164-65.
4. Id. at 166.
5. Id.
775
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
and comfort to the enemy.' There was no question that
Hodges had returned the prisoners and that this was treason
under the express terms of the law.7 Still, he might be saved
by an affirmative defense that could justify or excuse his
actions. At trial, the prosecutor argued that only a threat to
Hodges's own life could justify his actions.8 One judge agreed
with the prosecutor that Hodges had no legally cognizable
defense.' It looked grim for Hodges, but both judges, one of
whom was Gabriel Duvall, a U.S. Supreme Court Justice,'o
agreed that the jurors were not bound to conform to the
judges' opinions because "they have a right, in all criminal
cases, to decide on the law and the facts.""
Defense counsel asked for an acquittal, and the jury,
"without hesitating a moment," said, "Not Guilty." 2 After
weighing all the facts, the jury had the common sense to see
that Hodges's actions were not the kind that the treason law
was intended to prevent.
But today, the idea that a jury has a right to decide both
the law and facts of a case is confusing and distressing to
many judges and lawyers." The practice is called, often
pejoratively, "jury nullification"-a phrase the founders never
used. The concept of juries deciding both law and fact
becomes clearer once one grasps two simple insights that
were much better understood in the founding era.
The first insight goes back as far as Bracton, the great
English jurist of the thirteenth century. When the
government prosecutes an individual, it is a conflict of
interest for the representatives of the government to be the
final arbiters of the law.'4 Judges, though they strive to be
neutral and objective, are nevertheless government
6. Id. at 163, 169.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
8. The Trial of John Hodges, 10 Am. St. Tr. 163, 171 (C.C.D. Md. 1815).
9. Id. at 176.
10. Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 1811-1835. Id. at 163-64 n.2.
11. Id. at 176.
12. Id. at 181.
13. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Crispo et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus
Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1997); Charles P. Kocoras, Race-Based
Jury Nullification: Rebuttal (Part B), 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 929 (1997);
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Not Jury Nullification; Not a Call for Ethical Reform; But
Rather a Case for Judicial Control, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1996).
14. HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIAE 119
a, b (c. 1260).
776 [Vol:51
THE INDEPENDENT JURY
employees. They receive their salaries from the same entity
that prosecutes the case.'" An old legal maxim comes into
play: "No one should be judge in his own cause."' 6  If the
government's representative could dictate the law, then it
didn't matter who decided the facts-the law could always be
twisted and manipulated to turn any set of facts into some
sort of crime." The ultimate protection for the accused, then,
was to bring in a group of his peers, not connected to the
government, to be the final judges of the whole issue, that is,
both law and fact.'8 Hence, juries.
The essence of the second insight is contained in a single
word from Bushell, a landmark case from 1670 regarding the
role of juries." The word is complicately. The English Court
of Common Pleas held that juries could not be punished for
their verdicts because they decided the law and the facts
complicately2 0-that is, in combination,2 ' or, both at the same
time. Today, we might use the word "holistically,"2 2 or we
might say that the jury looks at the "gestalt"2 of the case and
then reaches a verdict. The two must be decided together
because a law without a fact is meaningless. As the Court in
Bushell said, "Without a fact agreed, it is as impossible ... to
know the law relating to the fact ... as to know an accident
that hath no subject." 24
The jury does not apply the law to the facts mechanically.
Rather, the jury weighs the law and the facts together and
reaches a just verdict. The verdict is greater than the sum of
15. Justice Scalia's description of a judge as a "lone employee of the State"
perfectly captures this point. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14
(2004).
16. "Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1850 app. B (9th ed. 2009).
17. See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185, 291 (1855) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
18. See id.
19. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, for Alleged Misconduct as
a Juryman, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. 999 (1670) (Vaughan, C.J.).
20. See id. at 1017.
21. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
22. "Holistic" is the adjectival version of "holism," a word defined as "the
theory that parts of a whole are in intimate interconnection, such that they ...
cannot be understood without reference to the whole . . . ." CONCISE OXFORD
AMERICAN DICTIONARY 426 (2006).
23. "Gestalt" means "an organized whole that is perceived as more than the
sum of its parts." CONCISE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 376 (2006).
24. Bushell, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. at 1010.
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the facts and the law, just as a song is more than the sum of
the words and the music. Putting the elements together
creates something that transcends the component parts. To
borrow a term from chemistry, the jury doesn't merely mix
the law and the facts, it compounds them.25
What has come to be called "jury nullification" today is
merely an occasional byproduct of a jury's right and duty to
determine the law and the facts complicately. Once one
understands this right, the phrase "jury nullification" loses
much of its usefulness. I prefer instead to speak of "jury
discretion," "jury independence," or a jury's right to reach a
"verdict according to conscience."
But a few generations after this country's founding,
judges had already invented ways to discourage the notion
that a jury decides both law and fact. In 1851, for example, a
federal judge offered a completely different view of the jury's
function.2 6 Robert Morris, a black attorney in Massachusetts,
was on trial for aiding the escape of a fugitive slave." The
newly enacted Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 required law
enforcement officials, based only on a claimant's affidavit, to
arrest anyone alleged to be a runaway slave.2 8 The accused
slave was not entitled to a trial or even to speak on his own
behalf.29
Morris's attorney wished to tell the jurors that they
should judge the law as well as the facts; if they believed that
the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional, they should
disregard any contrary instructions from the judge." Such
an exercise of jury discretion would go beyond the actions of
25. "Mix" may be defined as "juxtapose or put together to form a whole
whose constituent parts are still distinct." CONCISE OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY 568 (2006). A "compound" is defined in chemistry as a
"homogeneous substance consisting of atoms or ions of two or more different
elements in definite proportions that cannot be separated by physical means. A
compound usually has properties unlike those of its constituent elements." THE
FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/com-pound (last visited
Jan. 3, 2011). See People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1804) ("[A] libel is a compound of law and fact.").
26. United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No.
15,815).
27. CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE
81 (1998).
28. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (amending Act of Feb. 12,
1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302) (repealed 1864).
29. Id.
30. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 81-82.
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the jury in the Hodges case. Rather than asking the jurors to
decide if a particular application of a law was unjust, Morris's
attorney wanted the jurors, against the judge's advice, to
reject the law as unconstitutional."
The presiding judge, Supreme Court Justice Benjamin
Curtis, riding circuit in Massachusetts," ruled that jurors
could not decide questions of law." Nevertheless, the jury
acquitted Morris of the crime of helping to free a man from
slavery.34
Justice Curtis's ruling in Morris (discussed in more detail
later in this article) conflicts with the earlier opinion in
Hodges, and indeed with U.S. Supreme Court precedent,35
regarding a jury's independence. But Morris would become
precedent for the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Sparf v.
United States,3 6 which dealt a near-death blow to a jury's
right to determine both law and fact.
How did we get from Hodges to Morris to Sparf? This
article seeks to demonstrate that Hodges represents the
unmistakable view of most of the framers of the new
American government-including Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams, Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, and John Jay-
that criminal juries were meant to be the representatives of
the people against the government in the judicial process.
The jury was the "palladium," or guardian, of liberty, as
Blackstone said.3 ' And as the Supreme Court has recognized,
"[tihe guarantees of jury trial ... reflect a profound judgment
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal
31. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 98-104 (1998) (discussing the jury's purported right to judge
constitutionality of a law).
32. Supreme Court justices of that time were required to serve as judges of
the federal circuit courts. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 145 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
33. United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1336 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No.
15,815).
34. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 82.
35. See Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 (1794).
36. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
37. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343
(1769). A "palladium" is "a safeguard or source of protection." CONCISE OXFORD
AMERICAN DICTIONARY 638 (2006).
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defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government.""
An element of this understanding was the recognition
that juries could not function as the guardians of liberty if
they determined only the facts. Furthermore, they could not
resolve law and fact separately; they had to resolve them
together. Juries had to be able to exercise their equitable
discretion and acquit a person who was unjustly prosecuted,
in spite of the strict letter of the law, exactly as a Maryland
jury acquitted John Hodges. Even more than that, a jury
could acquit when it considered the law itself to be unjust.
Thus, the jury that acquitted Robert Morris against the
judge's advice took a step toward derailing the barbaric
fugitive slave laws, and, ultimately, slavery itself.
Part I of this article examines the bases for the founders'
enthusiasm for independent juries. The founders generally
understood that in criminal cases, law and fact are
complicately interwoven and that a jury's verdict is a moral
judgment as well as a legal one. Part II attempts to trace the
demise of jury independence in the nineteenth century.
Along the way, I hope to expose some of the legal and logical
fallacies employed by courts in eroding a jury's right to
determine the law as well as the facts. In Part III, I will
address and, I hope, refute many of the arguments currently
used to discourage jury independence. Part IV suggests that
one way we might help jurors find the right balance between
rule and discretion is merely to refrain from instructing them
that the judge has the final word on the law.
I. THE FRAMERS' VIEW OF THE INDEPENDENT JURY
In order to understand the jury's constitutional role, we
might study the jury's history during many eras: in ancient
times;39 in early English history;4 0 in the colonial era and
during the American Revolution;" and shortly before, during,
38. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
39. See generally, e.g., JOHN PETTINGAL, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE AND
PRACTICE OF JURIES AMONG THE GREEKS AND ROMANS; FROM WHENCE THE
ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH JURY MAY PROBABLY BE DEDUCED (1769).
40. See generally, e.g., THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800
(1985).
41. See generally, e.g., Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of
Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
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and after the enactment of the Constitution. All of these
historic views are instructive. The jury was an institution
largely inherited from England. When the founders spoke of
the jury in the Constitution, they didn't define the term
because juries were a well-known component of the existing
legal system.
Nevertheless, while the founders used the British legal
system as a starting point, they were willing to improve it in
ways that would align with their new vision of government.
"Revolutionary colonials refused to define law as an
instrument of the state which could not be judged by the
common man. Rather, they viewed it as the reflection of their
community which ordinary men were equally capable of
judging for themselves." 43 Law was not something imposed
on the people from above, but something that arose from the
people themselves. Therefore, the statements and practices
from around the time of the creation of the new government
under the Constitution are the most authoritative in
understanding what the new American jury was expected to
be."
This renewed belief in jury independence-an idea as old
as the thirteenth century, but one that courts have often lost
sight of through the centuries-was entirely in tune with
what historian Gordon Wood has called the "radicalism" of
the American Revolution.4 5 The Revolution was a
transformative break with what had gone before.4 6 It swept
away old ideas of hierarchy and paternalism, and replaced
them with an enthusiasm for liberty, equality, and
independence.7
Indeed, the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was so
uncontroversial at the Constitutional Convention that it is
one of the few rights that appears in the original 1789
CRIMINOLOGY 111, 112 (1998).
42. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 582, 583-84 (1939).
43. Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson's Jury: Sparf and
Hansen v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353, 388 (2004).
44. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 151, 169 (1895) (Gray, J.,
dissenting).
45. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1991).
46. See id. at 5.
47. See id. at 11-23, 43-56.
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Constitution before the Bill of Rights was added.4 8 The right
reappears, with more specific guarantees, in the Sixth
Amendment. Alexander Hamilton insisted that no one
doubted the value of juries.49 By the time of the
Constitutional Convention, twelve states had adopted their
own constitutions, and the only provision common to all was
the right to trial by jury in a criminal case.50  Many
considered the Magna Carta a source of the cherished right to
a jury trial," and the framers were well aware that
Blackstone had declared of the jury that "the liberties of
England cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains
sacred and inviolate .... "52
Those founders who spoke on the subject unanimously
and emphatically agreed that a "trial by jury" meant trial by
a jury that was the final judge of both law and fact. John
Adams stated that "the common people . . . should have as
complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment
of a court of judicature" as they have, through the legislature,
in other decisions of government.53  He further elaborated
that "[ilt is not only [the juror's] right but his duty . . . to find
the verdict according to his own best understanding,
judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the
direction of the court."5 4
Thomas Jefferson said that "juries [are] our judges of all
fact, and of law when they choose it."55 Alexander Hamilton,
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
50. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J.
641, 651 (1996).
51. See MAGNA CARTA, c. 39 (1215) ("No free man shall be seized or
imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or
deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force
against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his
equals or by the law of the land.") (emphasis added); see also id. c. 21 (earls and
barons fined only by their equals). Some have doubted whether the Magna
Carta references alluded to jury trial. See WILLIAM SHARPE McKECHNIE,
MAGNA CARTA 456 n.2 (2d ed. 1913). But the founders were probably familiar
with Blackstone's assertion that "trial by jury, or the country . . . is also that
trial by the peers of every Englishman, which, as the grand bulwark of his
liberties, is secured to him by the great charter." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37,
at 342-43.
52. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 343 (emphasis in original).
53. 2 JOHN ADAMS, WORKS 253 (1850).
54. Id. at 255.
55. Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, 1816. ME 15:35.
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arguing a seditious libel case before a New York court, took
up the same theme:
[I]n criminal cases, the law and fact being always blended,
the jury, for reasons of a political and peculiar nature, for
the security of life and liberty, are intrusted with the
power of deciding both law and fact.
[Tihe court are the constitutional advisers of the jury, in
matters of law, who may compromit [i.e., endanger,
compromise] their consciences by lightly or rashly
disregarding that advice; but may still more compromit
their consciences by following it, if, exercising their
judgments with discretion and honesty, they have a clear
conviction that the charge of the court is wrong.5 6
Adams, Jefferson, and Hamilton often had their
disagreements, yet they agreed on the principle that jurors
were the final judges of both law and fact. This unanimity
among the founders is reflected by an anonymous anti-
federalist who wrote, "It is essential in every free country,
that common people should have a part and share of
influence.... The trial by jury ... [has] procured for them, in
this country, their true proportion of influence."" The
founders believed that juries had, not merely the power, but
the right, to decide both law and fact. 8 This is part of the
understanding that informs the word "jury" as it appears in
the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
A. The Jury's Power Versus the Jury's Right to Decide the
Law
Some commentators maintain that a jury's discretionary
power over criminal verdicts is a mere accident of our legal
system.59 The double jeopardy principle, they may argue,
56. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 361-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
57. Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 249-50 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
58. The British Jacob's Law Dictionary, the most widely used legal
dictionary in colonial Virginia, CONRAD, supra note 27, at 46, stated in its
definition of "jury" that juries "go according to their consciences" and that juries
could "take upon them the knowledge of the law, and give a general
verdict . . . ." JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY (1782).
59. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the
Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 500 (1998)
(describing toleration of jury discretion as a "byproduct of the careful defense of
7832011]
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which prevents retrial of an acquitted defendant, coupled
with the principle that jurors may not be punished for their
verdicts, gives jurors a loophole by which they may ignore the
judge's instructions with impunity and acquit in spite of the
law.
The crux of the argument is that the mere power to do an
act is not the same as the right to do it. This is no more than
to repeat the truism that might does not make right. But
when we speak of a legal system of authorized and allocated
responsibilities, legal power and legal right become almost
synonymous. Does Congress, for example, have the legal
right to borrow money on the credit of the United States, coin
money, establish post offices, and create federal courts? Yes,
because the Constitution gives it the power to do these
things."o Does the President have the legal right to veto bills
passed by Congress? Yes, because the Constitution
authorizes him to do so." If the Constitution hadn't given
him the power, but he tried to exercise it all the same, we
would say he exceeded his powers, and thereby, his rights.
The President has discretion on whether to veto a bill, just as
Congress has discretion on whether to declare war. In
criminal cases, the ultimate discretion about whether to
convict a person had to be allocated to some actor in the legal
system. Our system gave it to jurors, not judges or
prosecutors.
As Englishman Thomas Erskine argued in 1784, "[i]f the
Jury . . . may determine the whole matter by their verdict,
and if the verdict when given is not only final and
unalterable, but must be enforced ... by the whole power of
the state,-upon what principle of government or reason can
it be argued not to be law?"6 2
The issue of the jury's right versus its power arose in
People v. Croswell, a New York state case from 1804 that was
eerily reminiscent of the legendary John Peter Zenger case of
1735. In Zenger, a jury defied the judge's instructions on the
law and acquitted a man accused of seditious libel for
criticizing the governor of New York. 3 In Croswell, the
other fundamental values").
60. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
61. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.
62. 1 THOMAS ERSIGNE, SPEECHES 163 (James Ridgway ed. 1813).
63. See generally JOHN PETER ZENGER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE
784 [Vol:51
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charge was once again seditious libel, and a central issue was
again the jury's right to decide both law and fact.'
Alexander Hamilton, representing the defendant,"5 argued
that a jury's right to determine the law followed from the fact
that juries had been given this power with no restraint:
[I]t is not only the province of the jury, in all criminal
cases, to judge of the intent with which the act was done,
as being parcel of the fact; they are also authorized to
judge of the law as connected with the fact. . . . [Iun
criminal cases, the law and fact are necessarily blended by
the general issue, and a general verdict was always final
and conclusive, both upon the law and the fact. Nor were
the jury ever exposed to an attaint [a writ to inquire
whether a jury had given a false verdict"] for a verdict in
a criminal case; and this is decisive to prove that they had
a concurrent jurisdiction with the court on questions of
law; for where the law allows an act to be valid and
definitive, it presupposes a legal and rightful authority to
do it. This is a sure and infallible test of a legal power.67
As Justice Kent68 explained in his opinion on the case,
our legal system has granted discretionary power to juries
because it has determined that jurors are best suited to
exercise this power:
But while the power of the jury is admitted, it is denied
that they can rightfully or lawfully exercise it, without
compromitting [compromising] their consciences, and that
they are bound implicitly, in all cases, to receive the law
AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY
JOURNAL (Paul Finkelman ed., Brandywine Press 1997) (1736; reprinted 1738,
1756, 1770, 1799). Although the pamphlet tells its story from Zenger's
viewpoint, it is thought to have been ghostwritten by his attorney, James
Alexander.
64. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804). "N.Y. Sup.
Ct." refers to the "Supreme Court of Judicature," one of the highest state courts
of law in New York before 1848. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION 254 tbl. T.1 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
65. Another similarity between Croswell and Zenger is that the defense
attorneys in both cases, though not related, were named Hamilton-Alexander
in Croswell, and Andrew in Zenger.
66. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 146 (9th ed. 2009).
67. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. at 355.
68. James Kent became the first professor of law at Columbia College in
1793, and since 1923, Columbia Law School has recognized outstanding
students as James Kent Scholars. See Academic Recognition, COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL, http://www.law.columbia.edu/academics/registrar/academic-recognition
(last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
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from the court. The law must, however, have intended, in
granting this power to a jury, to grant them a lawful and
rightful power, or it would have provided a remedy
against the undue exercise of it. The true criterion of a
legal power, is its capacity to produce a definitive effect
liable neither to censure nor review. And the verdict of
not guilty, in a criminal case, is, in every respect,
absolutely final. The jury are not liable to punishment,
nor the verdict to control. No attaint lies, nor can a new
trial be awarded. The exercise of this power in the jury
has been sanctioned, and upheld in constant activity, from
the earliest ages. It was made a question by Bracton ...
who was to sit in judgment upon and decide points of law .
. . in capital cases. It could not be the king, he says, for
then he would be both prosecutor and judge; nor his
justices, for they represented him.69
The reference to Bracton 0 explains the fundamental reason
why juries, not judges, must be the final arbiters of the law in
criminal cases: "No one should be judge in his own cause."7
It is not appropriate for an employee of the government to be
the ultimate judge of the law in a case in which the
government is a party. As Blackstone said, "in times of
difficulty and danger, more is to be apprehended from the
violence and partiality of judges appointed by the crown, in
suits between the king and the subject, than in disputes
between one individual and another . . . ."72 The solution,
then, is to bring in a group of citizens, not connected to the
government, to be the final judges of both law and fact.
Judges should act as advisors to the jury on legal issues, but
the jurors are not bound by their advice.
Justice Benjamin Thomas of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court elaborated on this principle in dissent in 1855,
69. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. at 368.
70. See BRACTON, supra note 14, at 119 a, b. Bracton went on to say that
"the court and the peers shall judge." Id. at 119 b. "Court," in this context,
probably meant the king's nobles, whom Bracton saw as a check on the king's
power. See id. at 34. Under the Magna Carta, nobles were judged by other
nobles, just as common men were judged by their peers. MAGNA CARTA, c. 21,
39 (1215).
71. "Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1850 (9th ed. 2009).
72. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 343.
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even while a majority of the justices were voting to curtail the
jury's right to decide the law":
If [the King] or his judges could decide the law, it is plain
that it would be quite immaterial who should decide the
facts. History shows, by the saddest lessons, that there
are no facts out of which constructive treason,
conspiracies, sedition or libel cannot be made. The only
safety of the subject was in the judgment of his peers upon
the whole issue.
This power of absolute discharge and deliverance of the
prisoner, upon the whole issue of law and fact, has existed
now for six centuries; it has been used to defeat the crown
in its most cherished purposes; it has continued without
change. To say that a power of last resort, for the undue
exercise of which there is no remedy, was never meant to
be used, that it can never be rightfully used, seems to me,
with all respect, a contradiction in terms.7 4
The double jeopardy principle and the principle that
jurors may not be punished for their verdicts have sound
policy reasons underlying them. Double jeopardy prevents
the government from wearing down an individual with
repeated prosecutions for the same crime. The prohibition
against punishing jurors allows them to follow their
consciences without fear of punishment. But more
fundamentally, both principles recognize that "only the jury
can strip a man of his liberty or his life."76 Both principles
evince a deep respect for the jury's right to have the last word
on the "whole issue." Our system has given this final power
to jurors because it meant for them to have it.
73. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a statute
authorizing jurors "to decide at their discretion, by a general verdict, both the
fact and the law involved in the issue . . . " violated the state constitution on
separation of powers grounds. See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185,
187, 236, 251 (1855) (Shaw, C.J., and Bigelow, J., concurring). See infra Part
III.E for discussion of the "separation of powers" doctrine as it relates to jury
independence.
74. Id. at 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
76. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
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B. James Wilson: The Value of Juries
Why was the jury seen as so important in the founding
era? The most thorough analysis of the value and purpose of
juries from any of the founding fathers may be that of James
Wilson, a signer of both the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution, and an original Supreme Court Justice."
Wilson's influence on the Constitution was considered second
only to Madison's. 8 In 1790 and 1791, Wilson gave a series of
lectures on the law that were designed to make him the
American equivalent of Blackstone.7 9 The series included an
extensive lecture, entitled "On Juries."80 A study of Wilson's
lecture and some of the key sources he cites is thus an ideal
window into the founders' views on the jury system.
Wilson begins by admitting that he loves and admires the
trial by jury." He concedes, however, what appears to be a
weakness in the jury system-namely, that juries must
exercise discretion.8 2 This is because a jury must judge the
facts, and there can be no hard and fast rules about how one
weighs one set of facts against another. Wilson equates
discretion with arbitrariness and laments that there would
then appear to be no principled difference between a jury's
discretion and a dictator's. 4 But he resolves the paradox by
noting that a jury's decision is that of twelve people, not one,
and that it is a unanimous decision.85 The unanimous verdict
of the jury serves as a proxy for the judgment of the "whole
society":
If there must be, in every political society, an absolute and
discretionary power over even the lives of the citizens; let
the operation of that power be such, as would be
sanctioned by unanimous and universal approbation.
Suppose then, that, in pursuing this train of thought, we
77. Kermit L. Hall, Introduction to 1 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS
xiii-xiv (Liberty Fund, Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
78. Id. at xiii.
79. Id. at xiv.
80. 2 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS 954-1011 (Liberty Fund, Kermit
L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
81. Id. at 954.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 954-57.
84. Id. at 957.
85. Id. at 957-58.
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assume the following position-that the evidence, upon
which a citizen is condemned, should be such as would
govern the judgment of the whole society.86
Wilson frequently repeats the phrase, "the whole society,"
in his lecture. He states that before the formation of
society, the right to punish belonged to the aggrieved
individual; in well-formed societies, this right was transferred
to the community. If it were practicable for the entire
community to be present to judge the accused, then a
majority vote would perhaps be appropriate; but where only a
small portion of the community makes the judgment, and
that group must exercise discretion in weighing the evidence,
only a unanimous verdict ensures that the final result will
safely reflect the judgment of the society as a whole." The
jurors would be forced to deliberate, to state their opinions to
each other, and to defend them until they could come to a
consensus. The deliberation and debate required to reach
that conclusion would ensure that the result represented the
view of the community. If there must be discretion, let it
reside with "We, the People," represented by a unanimous
jury whose verdict speaks as the "conscience of the
community.""o
If the jury verdict is valuable because it represents the
judgment of the society as a whole, it is also valuable for what
it is not-namely, the judgment of one individual. Wilson
expresses his distrust towards such judgments, and this
aversion is expressed more vehemently in a source he
frequently cites, Englishman John Pettingal's 1769 treatise
on juries." Pettingal praises the jury as inimical to
dictatorship:
Where this method of trial by many in any degree
obtained, there public liberty was cherished; which is the
reason why we never find this institution in any despotic
government either ancient or modern; for indeed, how
could the deliberate and free judgment of many be
86. 2 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS 958 (Liberty Fund, Kermit L. Hall
& Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
87. E.g., id. at 958, 959, 961.
88. Id. at 958-59.
89. Id. at 958-60.
90. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968).
91. PETIINGAL, supra note 39.
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admitted in this case, in a state where every thing else
was determined by the absolute will of one.92
Pettingal traces the trial by jury from the ancient
Athenians to the Romans, who, he believes, brought it to
Britain when Julius Caesar invaded.93  He argues that the
mark of liberty, according to Aristotle, is to have equal
participation in the protection and benefits of the law. 94
Aristotle said that the right to judge all persons in all cases
belongs to the people in general.95 For Pettingal, the purpose
of the jury was "the protection of the lower people from the
power and oppression of the Great, by administering equal
law and justice to all ranks . ... 9  John Adams echoed this
sentiment, warning that judges, "being few . . . might be
easily corrupted; being commonly rich and great, they might
learn to despise the common people, and forget the feelings of
humanity, and then the subject's liberty and security would
be lost."" In short, an important function of the jury was to
protect the weak against the mighty.
Jurors would "find a salutary lesson for their conduct, in
forming the collected verdict of the whole from the separate
judgment of each."" Again, a jury of twelve ordinary citizens,
who would listen to the evidence, deliberate among
themselves, and come to a unanimous conclusion would be
the safeguard against the whims of an individual decision
maker, who might easily make a snap judgment based on
personal prejudices or interests. It is difficult to think of a
judge, no matter how wise and empathetic he or she may be,
as representing the society as a whole.
To achieve a representative tribunal, we must draw the
jury from a group of laymen coming from all levels of society.
When we do this, we are bound to lose some of the technical
expertise that we would have kept if we had given judges the
task of applying the law to the facts. Most of the framers of
92. Id. at 3. I have modernized Pettingal's spelling, typography, and
capitalization throughout this article.
93. See id. at 140-46.
94. Id. at 22-23.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Id. at v.
97. THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 55 (C. Bradley
Thompson ed. 2000).
98. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 970 (quoting ANDREW HORNE, THE
MIRROUR OF JUSTICES (c. 1290)).
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the Constitution were lawyers who were well aware of this
fact. Yet, they adamantly insisted on juries as a basic
cornerstone of the new government.
C. Juries as Judges of Law and Fact
What was meant by the concept that jurors were judges
of both law and fact? Let us consider Pettingal, who says, "a
special verdict is a plain proof that the jury are judges of law
as well as facts; for leaving the judgment of the law to the
court implies, that if they pleased they had that power of
judgment in themselves."" When a jury felt stymied as to
how to apply the agreed-upon facts to the law, it could choose
to give a "special verdict," which stated only its findings of
fact. 100
For example, a jury in a murder case might be
unanimous as to the facts of the case, but unsure whether
those facts amounted to murder or manslaughter. The jury
could then give a "special verdict" stating only its view of the
facts and leaving the legal application to the judge.'' The
implication, as Pettingal explains, is that in a general, rather
than special verdict, "[w]hen the question is asked the jury,
guilty or not guilty, which includes the law, in their answer
they resolve both law and fact."'02
Note that Pettingal speaks of "resolving" both law and
fact, rather than "deciding" them. While "resolve" and
"decide" are synonyms, 03 "resolve" more strongly suggests
that the law and facts have undergone a chemical
compounding that creates something new-a verdict
(meaning, "true saying"'), and that this verdict resolves (or
"re-solves") the problem of what to do with the case. The final
verdict is thus something greater than the sum of law and
fact.
James Wilson notes that the Second Statute of
Westminster of 1285105 declared the discretionary right of the
99. PETTINGAL, supra note 39, at 121 (italics in original).
100. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
101. See 2 WILsON, supra note 80, at 996-97.
102. PETTINGAL, supra note 39, at 122 (italics in original).
103. See CONCISE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 234 (2006) (defining
"decide" as "come to a resolution in the mind as a result of consideration.").
104. See id. at 1008 (showing "verdict" as derived from words meaning "true
saying").
105. 13 EDW. I, c. 30 (1285).
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jury to decide only the facts if it chose: "[Tihe justices . . .
shall not compel the jurors to say precisely, whether it is or is
not a disseisin [wrongful dispossession of land]."106 This
would have been a legal conclusion and would have involved
the application of law to facts. "It is sufficient that they show
the truth of the fact, and pray the assistance of the justices.
But if they will voluntarily say, whether it is or is not a
disseisin, their verdict shall be received at their own peril."07
The words, "at their own peril," explain why the jurors might
not want to reach a legal conclusion-they could be punished
if they were thought to have reached the wrong verdict.108
This statute merely codified the common law. 09
Wilson argues that, generally, facts are the jury's
province and law is the judge's: where the issue is purely
legal, such as a failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, the judge decides; where the law is straightforward
but the facts are disputed, the jury decides. 10 When the
question of law is intimately bound up with the question of
fact, the jury must listen carefully to the judge's explanation
of the law."' But a difficulty may arise when the judge and
jury disagree on the law:
Suppose that . . . a difference of sentiment takes place
between the judges and the jury, with regard to a point of
law: suppose the law and the fact to be so closely
interwoven, that a determination of one must, at the same
time, embrace the determination of the other ... what must
the jury do?-The jury must do their duty, and their whole
duty: they must decide the law as well as the fact."2
Wilson explains that this is especially true in criminal
cases, where, not only are the facts important, "but also the
motive, to which it [the crime] owed its origin, and from
which it receives its complexion. ... On the [motive], depends
106. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 996. See 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 86.
107. Id. (quoting 13 EDW. I, c. 30).
108. See 1 GILES DUNCOMBE, TRIALS PER PAIS. OR, THE LAW OF ENGLAND
CONCERNING JURIES BY NIsI PRIuS, &c. 221-22 (6th ed. 1725) (listing a range of
punishments, including loss of lands and goods, that could be leveled at jurors
who gave false verdicts).
109. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 996-97.
110. Id. at 1000.
111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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the innocence or criminality of the action."" 3 Wilson concedes
that it may seem extraordinary that a jury of twelve,
untutored in the law, might overrule a panel of learned
judges; but in criminal cases, it is the .jury's duty to look at
the whole picture and come to a final judgment:
In criminal cases, the design [i.e., motive] . .. is closely
interwoven with the transaction; and the elucidation of
both depends upon a collected view of particulars . . .. Of
all these, the jury are fittest to make the proper
comparison and estimate; and, therefore, it is most eligible
to leave it to them, after receiving the direction of the
court in matters of law, to take into their consideration all
the circumstances of the case, the intention as well as the
facts, and to determine, on the whole, whether the prisoner
has or has not been guilty of the crime, with which he is
charged." 4
This is a description of a jury deciding a case
"complicately"-a word that was coined by the English Chief
Justice Vaughan"' in the landmark Bushell case of 1670,n1
cited by Wilson."I One cannot understand a jury's historic
function without understanding Bushell.
D. Resolving Law and Fact "Complicately": Penn, Bushell,
Vaughan
Edward Bushell was a juror in the trial of two Quakers,
William Penn and William Mead. Penn and Mead were
accused of "tumultuous assembly" for preaching to a crowd in
the streets after they were ousted from their church under a
statute that prohibited non-Anglican church services." They
were indicted, however, not for violating the statute, but for,
in essence, disturbing the peace under the common law."19
The crown's evidence consisted of less than five minutes
113. Id. at 1000-01.
114. Id. at 1001 (emphasis added).
115. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (listing Vaughan's use
of "complicately" as its earliest reference).
116. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, for Alleged Misconduct as
a Juryman, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. 999 (1670).
117. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 979, 999.
118. See The Trial of William Penn & William Mead, at the Old Bailey, for a
Tumultuous Assembly, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. 951, 954-55 (1670). The law
prohibiting non-Anglican church services was the Conventicle Act. 16 CHARLES
II, c. 4 (1664) (repealed 1689).
119. See Penn, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. at 954-55, 957-62.
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of testimony from three witnesses who established merely
that Penn had been speaking to a large group of people in the
street."0 The only evidence that might even suggest that the
assembly was "tumultuous" was the witnesses' inability to
hear what Penn was saying.121 The crown does not appear to
have presented any coherent legal theory that would explain
what crime Penn had committed.
After some deliberation, the jurors deadlocked, eight to
four, in favor of conviction. 122 The judge sent them back to
deliberate further. Twice, they delivered verdicts saying only
that Penn was guilty of speaking or preaching in Grace-
church Street, but would not aver that he had caused a
tumult or an unlawful assembly.12 3 This would not do for the
crown, as speaking in Grace-church Street, by itself, was not
a crime. The court angrily adjourned for the night and
ordered that the jurors be kept all night without meat, drink,
fire, tobacco, or even a chamber-pot.12 4  The ensuing two
verdicts, given the next day, were the same as the two
previous. Finally, on the last verdict, the jury pronounced
both Penn and Mead "Not Guilty."12 5
But that wasn't the end of the matter. The jurors were
fined, and four who refused to pay were imprisoned at
Newgate.126 This led to the Bushell case, named for the most
obstreperous of the jurors at Penn's trial.127  Bushell
petitioned the Court of Common Pleas to release the jurors by
a Writ of Habeas Corpus; Chief Justice Vaughan wrote the
opinion of the court.128 The court noted that the trial court's
response to the petition complained that the imprisoned
jurors acquitted the defendant against full and manifest
evidence. This would not be enough to warrant
imprisonment, said Vaughan, unless the jurors returned the
verdict "corruptly,"2 9 for juries could not be punished for
120. Id. at 957.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 960-61.
123. Id. at 963-64.
124. Id.
125. The Trial of William Penn & William Mead, at the Old Bailey, for a
Tumultuous Assembly, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. 951, 964-66 (1670).
126. Id. at 967-69.
127. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, for Alleged Misconduct as
a Juryman, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. 999 (1670) (Vaughan, C.J.).
128. Id. at 999-1000.
129. Id. at 1005.
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their verdicts unless embracery (threats, bribery) or
subornation were involved.'3 0
The court explained that it is quite possible for
reasonable people to disagree on how a case should be
decided:
[H]ow comes it to pass that two persons may not
apprehend with reason and honesty, what a witness, or
many, say, to prove in the understanding of one plainly
one thing, but in the apprehension of the other clearly the
contrary thing? Must therefore one of these merit fine and
imprisonment, because he doth that which he otherwise
cannot do, preserving his oath and integrity? And this
often is the case of the judge and the jury.' 3 '
Furthermore, "the judge and the jury might honestly
differ in the result from the evidence, as well as two judges
may, which often happens."132 But if the judge could order a
particular verdict and punish the jury for disobeying him,
then what was the celebrated right of jury trial all about?133
The court explained what it meant for a jury to judge
both law and fact in general verdicts, interpreting the phrase
in much the same way that Pettingal and Wilson would later
interpret it:
[U]pon all general issues . . . though it be matter of law
whether the defendant be a trespasser, a debtor, disseisor,
or disturber in the particular cases in issue; yet the jury
find not (as in a special verdict) the fact of every case by
itself, leaving the law to the court, but find for the plaintiff
or defendant upon the issue to be tried, wherein they
resolve both law and fact complicately, and not the fact by
itself; so as they answer not singly to the question what is
the law, yet they determine the law in all matters, where
issue is joined. ... 134
Vaughan used the same word that Pettingal used-
"resolve"-when he said that juries "resolve both law and fact
complicately," that is, in combination. The court found the
trial judge's reasons for imprisoning the jurors legally
130. Id. at 1020.
131. Id. at 1006.
132. Id. at 1011.
133. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, for Alleged Misconduct as
a Juryman, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. 999, 1008 (1670) (Vaughan, C.J.).
134. Id. at 1014-17 (emphasis added).
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insufficient and discharged the prisoners.'3 5 The court held
that "the judge cannot fine the jury for going against their
evidence or direction of the court, without other
misdemeanour." 3 6
The practical results of the Bushell decision were
enormous. Jurors are virtually immune from punishment for
their verdicts, unless they are found to have accepted bribes.
It may be disputed, however, whether Bushell helps the case
for jury independence.'3 7 One might argue that Vaughan was
saying no more than that a jury and a judge may reasonably
disagree on the credibility of the evidence. 3 8 But in stressing
that juries decide law and fact complicately, Vaughan
emphasized that often the law and facts are so closely
intertwined that they must be decided together: "the jury ...
answer not singly to the question what is the law, yet they
determine the law in all matters." 3 9
E. Resolving Law and Fact "Complicately": A Holistic
Determination
Let us go back to a singular phrase used in James
Wilson's lecture on juries: "[Sluppose the law and the fact to
be so closely interwoven, that a determination of one must, at
the same time, embrace the determination of the other."'4 0 The
jury in the William Penn trial may have thought that
speaking to a crowd of three hundred people in the street
was, by definition, a "tumultuous assembly." Perhaps,
technically, Penn had violated the law. But the jury had to
take an extra step in its thinking and ask if that law was
really meant to keep a person from speaking to a crowd,
especially when the prosecution presented no evidence that
Penn's actions disturbed or inconvenienced anyone. Some of
135. Id. at 1006, 1026.
136. Id. at 1009 (emphasis added). "[O1ther misdemeanour" signifies that
"corrupt" verdicts due to threats, bribery, or subornation might be punished. Id.
at 1020. Jurors could also be fined for obstinately refusing to deliberate with
their fellow jurors, or for deserting from the jury after being selected. Id. at
1019-20.
137. See Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics:
Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J.
1815, 1815-16, 1822-27 (2002).
138. See Bushell, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. at 1012 ("A man cannot see by anothers
eye, nor hear by anothers ear . . .
139. Id. at 1016-17.
140. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1000 (emphasis added).
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the jurors may have been offended by the threat to religious
freedom that the charges against Penn represented. In
determining that Penn's actions were so innocuous that they
didn't warrant punishment, perhaps the jurors' judgment
about the facts determined their judgment about how the law
and the facts interacted.
Similarly, in the case of John Hodges, the townsman
accused of treason during the War of 1812, the jury, in
making its decision, must have seen that, technically, Hodges
had given aid and comfort to the enemy. But the jury is
required, as Wilson says, "after receiving the direction of the
court in matters of law, to take into their consideration all the
circumstances of the case, the intention as well as the facts,
and to determine, on the whole, whether the prisoner has or
has not been guilty of the crime . . ."141 In Hodges's case, the
facts and the intention were closely bound to the legal
question. Yes, Hodges had given aid and comfort to the
enemy. His motive, however, had not been to betray his
country but to save his fellow townspeople.
Wilson said, "[o]n the [motive], depends the innocence or
criminality of the action."14 2 As Blackstone said, the charges
of traitorous or felonious intent are the "very gist of the
indictment."14 3 One of the great advances in the history of
criminal law has been to consider the defendant's state of
mind, not just his physical act." The ultimate legal question
of guilt could not be decided without taking the defendant's
motive into account. As Chief Justice Vaughan said, juries
"answer not singly to the question what is the law."14 5  In
other words, jurors are not expected to construe statutes or
produce a definitive statement of the law; rather, they resolve
the question of the defendant's guilt after weighing together
the facts and the law.
141. Id. at 1001.
142. Id. at 1000-01.
143. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 333.
144. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil").
145. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, for Alleged Misconduct as
a Juryman, 6 Cobbett's St. Tr. 999, 1017 (1670) (Vaughan, C.J.).
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Critics have disparagingly called jury decisions such as
those in Penn and Hodges instances of "jury nullification," or
"jury lawlessness,"1 46 that may lead to anarchy. On the
contrary, these are examples of juries resolving the law and
the fact "complicately" in cases where, as Wilson said, "the
law and the fact [are] so closely interwoven, that a
determination of one must, at the same time, embrace the
determination of the other."147
The phrase "jury nullification" distorts the concept of jury
independence because it treats the jury's decision-making
process in binary terms-either the jury "nullified" or it
didn't, either the jury followed the law or it didn't. But the
jury goes through a much more complex process-it considers
all the circumstances and the law and comes to a final
judgment about the defendant's moral culpability. Some
members of a jury may vote "not guilty" entirely because they
see the evidence as weak; others, entirely because they see
the law as unjust; still others, because of a combination of the
two. In such a situation, it would be meaningless to say that
"the jury nullified." Yet it might be entirely accurate to say
that all jurors exercised their discretion, that all jurors voted
according to their consciences, and that the jury as a whole
operated as an independent jury.
If a juror keeps an open mind, listens to all the evidence,
and pays attention to the law, she might vote to convict even
if she disagrees with the law. Suppose a juror has a
considered opinion that current drug prohibition laws are bad
policy-that they foster violent crime, cause the
dissemination of dangerously tainted products, and do little
to reduce drug consumption. But suppose the evidence in a
drug trafficking case shows that the defendant sold cocaine to
children. Even if the defendant is charged only with drug
distribution, and not specifically with selling drugs to
children, the juror might vote to convict in spite of her
disagreement with the law. When the juror learns all the
facts and weighs them against the law, she may believe that
the defendant is morally culpable in a way that an adult who
buys small amounts of marijuana for his own use is not.
146. The phrase is most commonly associated with Roscoe Pound, who used
it tongue-in-cheek. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.
L. REV. 12, 17-19 (1910).
147. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1000.
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F. Jury Discretion: Equity versus Strict Legalism
Thomas Jefferson saw the power of the jury to decide
mixed questions of law and fact as a check on government:
If the question before [the magistrates] be a question of
law only, they decide on it themselves: but if it be of fact,
or of fact and law combined, it must be referred to a jury.
In the latter case, of a combination of law and fact, it is
usual for the jurors to decide the fact, and to refer the law
arising on it to the decision of the judges. But this
division of the subject lies with their discretion only. And
if the question relate to any point of public liberty, or if it
be one of those in which the judges may be suspected of
bias, the jury undertake to decide both law and fact. 148
Jefferson's reference to "public liberty" suggests the
importance of jury discretion to the goal of equity in the
criminal justice system.14 9 The concept of "equity" comes to
us from Aristotle, who considered it closely related to justice,
but superior to it. 150 The difficulty with creating laws is that
legislators must, of necessity, phrase laws in general terms,
knowing that they cannot foresee every set of facts that may
come within the scope of the law.' 1 Those who must apply
the law to particular cases will, from time to time, have to
make exceptions to the general rule in order to achieve a
higher justice:
When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises
on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then
it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by
oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the
legislator himself would have said had he been present,
and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence
the equitable is just . . . .152
148. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Q. XIV, ME
2:179 (1782) (emphasis added).
149. See John Clark, The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification, 24 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 39, 56 (2000) ("[H]ow can equity be achieved if . . . jury
nullification is suppressed?"); Douglas E. Litowitz, Jury Nullification: Setting
Reasonable Limits, 11-SEP CBA Rec. 16, 18 (1997) ("[J]ury nullification has
functioned something like the principle of equity. . . .").
150. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V: ch. X, at 89 (W.D. Ross trans.,
World Library Classics 2009) (c. 350 B.C.E.), available at
http://philosophy.eserver.org/aristotle/nicomachean-ethics.txt.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Thus, it is ultimately the jury's task, after taking the facts
and the law into account, to do what is right, to do that which
serves the purpose of the law as the legislator intended it. It
is fitting also that this legal conclusion must come from the
representatives of the community.
Those who criticize jury independence as jury
"lawlessness" may have a too-literal view of what "the law"
means. This issue may be illuminated by Richard Posner's
discussion of the "antinomies of legal theory" in his book Law
and Literature. Posner presents a two-column table of "legal
antinomies," or legal opposites, that illustrate the wide
spectrum of legal theory. 5 3  In the left column, under the
heading, "Government of laws," are concepts that represent
strict legalism-the law as an abstraction, law made up of
logic, strict rules, and sharp distinctions.154  In the right
column, under the heading, "Government of men," are terms
that illustrate the human side of making and dispensing law.
For example, here are some of the pairs from the table:
Government of laws Government of men
Letter Spirit
Law Equity or Justice or Mercy
Formalism Realism
Rule Principle
Logic Policy
Per se Rule Rule of Reason
Statute Law Common Law or Constitutional
Law
Strict Construction Loose Construction
Positive Law Natural Law
Judge Jury155
It is possible to think of other pairs. I would add:
Elements Factors
Bright-Line Rule Totality of the Circumstances Test
Contributory Negligence Comparative Negligence
153. RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 162 (3d ed. 2009).
154. Id. at 162-63.
155. See id. at 162. These pairs are extracted from the list, and I have
rearranged their order. I urge the reader to consult the full list in Judge
Posner's book for the light it may shed on many legal problems.
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But neither column by itself represents "the law."'
Rather, the law, in a mature society, as Posner explains, is a
mixture of both columns:
No civilized society has ever embraced the legalist position
in undiluted form. Every such society softens the rigors of
strict legalism by some or all of the devices listed in the
right-hand column . . . . It is because the strict
enforcement of rules is intolerable ... that law is the art of
governance by rules, rather than an automated machinery
of enforcement. Both the extreme of hyperlegalism and
the opposite extreme of a purely discretionary system of
justice are found only in primitive societies. Mature
societies mix strict law with discretion. Every entry in the
table can be found in modern American law. The mixture
is not inconsistent with the idea of law; it is the idea of
law .... 157
English and American systems once had separate courts
of law and equity. The law courts followed the strict letter of
the law, while the equity courts could leaven the law's
harshness with mercy."'s While we don't have separate
courts of law and equity anymore, courts still dispense both
law and equity-at least, they're supposed to.' 9 But the
nomenclature may be confusing: our having different courts
represent "law" and "equity" does not mean that equity is
outside of the law; on the contrary, equity is part of the
law. 6 0  To call a jury "lawless" when it does not follow the
strict letter of the law, but follows what it believes is its
spirit, is to insist upon the kind of undiluted legalism that
Posner attributes to primitive societies.' 6 1
156. Some languages have two different words for law. For example, in
Latin, lex refers to positive law, while jus refers to "the entire body of principles,
rules, and statutes, whether written or unwritten." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 991,936 (9th ed. 2009).
157. POSNER, supra note 153, at 163. See also Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew
G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 867, 921 (1994) ("A mature legal system must blend law and discretion,
rights and care, and the professional and popular administration ofjustice.").
158. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 97-115 (4th
ed. 2002).
159. See FED. R. CIv. P. 1, notes to 2007 Amendment (noting merger of law
and equity).
160. "Jus respicit aequitatem." ("Law regards equity"). BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1842 (9th ed. 2009).
161. See also Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81
MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1162-65 (1997) (summarizing Ronald Dworkin's view that
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Roscoe Pound has said that there is an "element of
discretion, of reason, of equity in its wider sense, inherent in
all law." 1 62  He has noted that while law is ceaselessly
evolving, legislation tends to "overlook the necessity of
squaring the rules upon the statute book with the demands of
human reason and the exigencies of human conduct." 16 3
Pound noticed the tendency of judges, during periods of legal
stability, to seek perfection of legal rules rather than
justice." He warned that legislatures that believed they
could put all the rules of judicial administration into the laws
would find a wide gap between the laws on the statute books
and the actual practices of courts.6 5
When James Wilson said that a jury is required, "after
receiving the direction of the court in matters of law, to take
into their consideration all the circumstances of the case, the
intention as well as the facts, and to determine, on the whole,
whether the prisoner has or has not been guilty of the
crime," he was merely saying that there will be cases in
which a jury (right column in the table of legal antinomies)
should not follow a bright-line rule (left column), but must
employ a totality of the circumstances test (right column).
G. The Founders' View? Applying Equity to Modern Cases
Let's take a look at two hypothetical cases, A and B. In
hypothetical A, a man kills his wife as part of a scheme to
collect on her life insurance policy.'67  Here, a jury will
probably have no difficulty following the strict letter of the
law. The conduct is clearly murder under state statutes and
is also morally reprehensible. A jury that finds the facts
proved beyond a reasonable doubt will not think twice about
convicting.
the rule of law includes normative considerations outside the written rule); Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 706-708 (1995) (questioning the "rule of law as
myth").
162. Pound, supra note 146, at 23.
163. Id. at 22-23.
164. Id. at 23.
165. Id. at 34.
166. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1001.
167. See, e.g., Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 2000) (recounting that
defendant stated best way to retire before age forty would be to find an
unsuspecting girl, marry her, insure her life, murder her, and invest the
proceeds).
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But let's assume a different set of facts for hypothetical
B: a husband and wife are in their eighties, and the husband
is dying, slowly and painfully. He would take his own life,
but he is too weak to do so. He asks his doctor to give him
enough morphine to kill him, but the doctor refuses. He begs
his wife to put him out of his misery. She refuses at first, but
after helplessly watching his intense suffering and hearing
his anguished pleas, she relents. She injects him with a
lethal dose of morphine. She is charged with murder.'6 8
Under the laws of most states,16 9 and under the Model
Penal Code's definition of murder, 170 she is guilty because she
purposely caused the death of another human being. Under
the common law, "malice aforethought" would be an element
of the crime, but a judge would instruct the jury that the
intent to kill, by itself, is enough to constitute malice
aforethought."' Under the letter of the law, the woman is
clearly guilty. A jury will probably have a more difficult time
with this case, however, than with hypothetical A, and rightly
so. The woman made a difficult choice-many people would
say the right choice-under excruciating circumstances. Just
as John Hodges did during the War of 1812 when he saved a
town by returning captured soldiers to the enemy.
The jury will probably consider many things that have
nothing to do with the legal definition of murder. Did the
wife kill out of love, or out of some baser motive? Were the
husband's pleas for death so heart-rending that almost
anyone would have been moved by them? Did the husband
waver in his desire to be put to death, or was he insistent?
In reconciling the law to the facts, the jury might do a bit
of re-defining of the law on its own. Perhaps it will decide
that the woman's act couldn't have been "intentional"
because, in a sense, she had no choice. Or it might decide
that, despite the judge's instruction on the legal meaning of
"malice aforethought," she didn't act out of malice because
she didn't hate her husband. While these explanations would
168. Cf JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 100 (1992) (describing Dr.
Peter Rossier's mercy killing of his wife, who was terminally ill with cancer).
169. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-6-2; CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West
2010); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-701, 707-701.5; IDAHO CODE § 18-4001; 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1; KY. REV. STAT. § 507.020; 21 OKL. ST. ANN. § 701.7; 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502.
170. See Model Penal Code, Pt. II, §§ 210.1, 210.2.
171. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (9th ed. 2009).
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not get high marks on a law school exam, they are the kind of
commonsense rationalizations that juries often usel72 when
faced with a fact pattern that doesn't fit the law as easily as
that in hypothetical A.
And because the law doesn't fit the facts as cleanly, it
should not be applied with the same severity as in the more
sinister crime. As Wilson said, "On the [motive], depends the
innocence or criminality of the action." 7 3 In hypothetical B,
the jury will probably acquit or find the defendant guilty of a
lesser crime. I believe that this is exactly the kind of case in
which the framers wanted juries to have discretion, a case in
which some adjustment of the rigors of the law is
necessary. 174
H. Jury Independence in the Early Days of the Republic
If the founders had wanted to improve the chances that
the criminal law would be a matter of strict legalism, they
would have given the task of resolving law and fact to judges,
not juries. But they didn't. Emphatically, they didn't, as the
opinions of Jefferson, Wilson, Adams, and Hamilton, cited
earlier in this article, make clear.
Such statements indicate that during the founding era,
and for some years after, people's idea of a "trial by jury"
included a jury that could decide both law and fact
complicately. Additionally, very early Supreme Court
precedent supports this right. In 1794, in Georgia v.
Brailsford, one of the few trials ever held by the Supreme
Court, John Jay, our first Chief Justice and one of the authors
of the Federalist Papers, gave the jury the Court's unanimous
instructions on the law and afterwards clarified the jury's role
regarding law and facts:
172. See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and
Punishment, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 669, 676-691 (2000).
173. 2 WILSoN, supra note 80, at 1000-01.
174. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("If the defendant
preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it."); LEVINE, supra
note 168, at 26 ("It is the jurors' values, not their brains or knowledge, that
make their participation critical to due process."); Anne Bowen Poulin, The
Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377,
1400 (1994) ("The jury's power to nullify provides an accommodation between
the rigidity of the law and the need to hear and respond to positions that do not
fit legal pigeonholes . . . .").
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lOn questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on
questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide.
But it must be observed that . . . you have nevertheless a
right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to
determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On
this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no
doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the
opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is
presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on
the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best
judges of law. But still both objects are lawfully, within
your power of decision. 175
It might be argued here that Chief Justice Jay was doing
no more than reiterating the uncontroversial fact that the
jury could return either a special verdict or a general verdict.
I submit, however, that in its instruction, the Court (of which
James Wilson was a member) recognized the jury's right to
resolve the law and facts "complicately," and knew that juries
sometimes had to stretch the law to reconcile it to the facts
and achieve a just verdict. This was, after all, the highest
court in the land making, not an abstract doctrinal
pronouncement, but an instruction to a jury. If a court tells a
jury of laymen that it has a right to "determine the law," the
jury is likely to take the court at its word and believe that it
has the right to decide that the law is wrong or that the law is
something other than what the court has said. Chief Justice
Jay's instruction suggests that the Court would have greeted
such an outcome with equanimity.
Besides, if the instruction had meant only that the jurors
could give a general verdict, why did the Court express the
hope that the jurors would respect the Court's opinion on the
law when it said "[W]e have no doubt, you will pay that
respect, which is due to the opinion of the court . . . ."?
Delivering a general verdict would not have shown disrespect
for the Court. Juries had been giving general verdicts for at
least five centuries. Only by rejecting the Court's
interpretation of the law might the jurors have shown it any
disrespect. The instruction is all the more remarkable
because the facts of the case were undisputed.17 1 If juries
were only needed for fact-finding, the jury could have been
175. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (emphasis added).
176. Id.
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dismissed. Nevertheless, the Court entrusted the ultimate
issue, including a determination of the law, to the jury's good
sense.
A year later, Justice Iredell stated that "[T]hough the
jury will generally respect the sentiments of the court on
points of law, they are not bound to deliver a verdict
conformably to them.""' When Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Chase was impeached in 1805, he was accused of
denying jurors the right to judge the law as well as the facts
of a case and debarring defense counsel from addressing the
jury on the law.178 At his impeachment trial, which ended in
acquittal,"' Chase, rather than contend that it was a judge's
prerogative to dictate the law to the jury, argued that he had
done no such thing.1 so Chase defended the jurors' right to
judge the law."'
In 1817, Chief Justice John Marshall presided over a
piracy trial while riding circuit in Virginia.8 2 Defense
counsel noted that there was some disagreement about the
law because two eminent judges had expressed opposing
opinions on it.18 3 The attorney argued that "the jury in a
capital case were judges, as well of the law as the fact, and
were bound to acquit, where either was doubtful."18 4 Chief
Justice Marshall, who was no shrinking violet when it came
to asserting judicial prerogatives, made no effort to contradict
defense counsel's statement.'85 Instead, he gave his own
opinion on the law, but humbly admitted that the
disagreement between two highly respected judges meant
that the law was at least doubtful.' 6 Thus, as Clay Conrad
sums it up, "[t]he rule in the early federal courts was
unequivocal; it was admitted on all hands that jurors in
177. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. 19, 33 (1795).
178. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 59.
179. See Samuel Chase, ANSWERS.COM,
http://www.answers.com/topic/samuel-chase (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
180. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 59.
181. Id.
182. United States v. Hutchings, 26 F.. Cas. 440 (C.C.D. Va. 1817) (No.
15,429).
183. Id. at 442.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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criminal trials were the rightful judges of both facts and
law."' 87
II. THE RISE OF POST-FOUNDING-ERA STRICT LEGALISM AND
THE EROSION OF JURY INDEPENDENCE
A. Justice Story Introduces a Stricter Legalism
But a generation or so after Brailsford, the judicial
attitude toward juries had begun to change. This was
exemplified in opinions of Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story, who in 1811, was appointed to the Court at age thirty-
two."8 s If the democratic spirit had ever bitten Justice Story,
he seems to have lost it as he aged. He had repudiated the
oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts in his youth, but he later
recanted and suggested that they were constitutional.8 s
Historian Vernon Parrington said that Story's Commentaries
on The Constitution of The United States marked the
"triumph of the lawyer" over "the historian and political
philosopher" and "the beginning of the lawyer's custodianship
of the fundamental law."190  Story's less-than-trusting
attitude toward juries can be seen in an opinion he wrote in a
patent case in 1818 while riding circuit in Massachusetts:
I have thus gone over the whole grounds of this cause, and
. . . the verdict is wrong. Under such circumstances, to
suffer it to stand, would be a mockery of justice. It would
be surrendering the whole rights of the community to the
mistakes or prejudices of juries. . . . [N]o judge in these
times can be weak or wicked enough to abandon, what his
duty plainly and peremptorily enjoins upon him. 19 1
Justice Story was always highly precise in his
instructions. As was the custom in those days, he frequently
commented on the quality and weight of the evidence and
would often suggest a verdict. In a typical case, after
summing up the facts, he advised the jury to find a verdict for
187. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 59.
188. GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 77-82 (1970).
189. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE STORY: STATESMAN OF
THE OLD REPUBLIC 164 (1985).
190. 2 VERNON Louis PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
303 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1987) (1927).
191. Barrett v. Hall, 1 Mason 447, 2 F. Cas. 914, 926-27 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818)
(No. 1047) (emphasis added).
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the plaintiffs on the facts if they were satisfied that there had
been no concealment or misrepresentation.19 2
Justice Story's instructions would carefully guide a jury
through his own thought processes on a case until the jurors
would have felt foolish not to decide the case Justice Story's
way. Story appears to have bristled at counsel who suggested
that jurors were judges of both law and fact. While
instructing the jury in a homicide case in 1816, Story warned:
"It is a great mistake that jurors are at liberty in matters of
law to disregard the opinion of the court ....
As authority for this statement, Story cited Foster's
Crown Law, written by an English judge of the King's Bench
and first published in 1762.19' The first section of the book
covers trials following the second Jacobite uprising of 1745.15
This rebellion attempted to restore to the throne the
descendants of James II, who had been deposed in the
Glorious Revolution of 1688.196
It seems odd that Justice Story would choose as his
authority for the respective roles of judge and jury, not the
words of Wilson or Jefferson or Hamilton, or Supreme Court
precedent such as Brailsford, but rather a British judge's
treatise that included reports on the treason trials of English
rebels. But Justice Story saw the common law, by which he
usually meant English law, as an important source for
interpreting the Constitution. 9 7  Crown Law's view of jury
independence was naturally a far cry from the revolutionary
spirit of John Adams's declaration that "[ilt is not only [the
juror's] right but his duty ... to find the verdict according to
his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience,
though in direct opposition to the direction of the court."'
192. Hubbard v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. 353, 12 F. Cas. 779, 779 (C.C.D. Mass.
1815) (No. 6816).
193. United States v. Bevans, 24 F. Cas. 1138, 1138 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No.
14,589) (emphasis added).
194. MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE
COMMISSION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE COUNTY
OF SURRY; AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES: TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES
UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF THE CROWN LAW 255 (3d ed. 1792) (1762).
195. Id. at 1-180.
196. Id.
197. NEWMYER, supra note 189, at 104, 124.
198. ADAMS, supra note 53 at 255.
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Crown Law counseled that applying the law to the facts was a
job best left to judges.'99
In 1835, another attorney made the mistake of arguing
that juries were the judges of both fact and law, and Justice
Story felt obliged to set the jurors straight:
My opinion is, that the jury are no more judges of the law
in a capital or other criminal case . . . than they are in
every civil case . . . . I deny, that, in any case, civil or
criminal, they have the moral right to decide the law
according to their own notions, or pleasure. On the
contrary, I hold it the most sacred constitutional right of
every party accused of a crime, that the jury should
respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is
the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and
it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid
down by the court.... If I thought, that the jury were the
proper judges of the law in criminal cases, I should hold it
my duty to abstain from the responsibility of stating the
law to them upon any such trial.200
The case, United States v. Battiste, came to be seen as a
turning point in the judicial attitude toward jury
independence.2 0 1 James Wilson probably would have agreed
with Story that the jury was not to decide the law on mere
whim. Wilson had said that a jury "must determine [legal]
questions . .. according to law. . . . [P]recedents, and customs,
and authorities, and maxims are alike obligatory upon jurors
as upon judges .... "202 But Wilson's view of "the law," which
included "customs" as well as "authorities," was about the
spirit as well as the letter of the law. Wilson probably would
have approved of a jury that went against a judge's
instruction on a point of what Jefferson called "public liberty,"
or that followed its conscience, as Adams said it should do.
199. FOSTER, supra note 194, at 256.
200. United States v. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). An old legal maxim advises us that juries decide facts
and judges decide law ("Ad quaestiones facti non respondent judices; ad
quaestiones legis non respondent juratores."). BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1817
(9th ed. 2009). But see LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY
123 (1852) ("[Slince Magna Carta, judges have had more than six centuries in
which to invent and promulgate pretended maxims to suit themselves; and this
[that judges decide law and jurors decide facts] is one of them.").
201. David N. Dorfman, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification
in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 873-74 (1995).
202. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1002 (emphasis added).
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Justice Story, however, saw deviation from the court's
instruction as a jury's succumbing to "notions" or "pleasure,"
rather than exercising its conscience or dispensing justice.
Particularly curious, and suspiciously disingenuous, is
Story's comment, "[i]f I thought, that the jury were the proper
. judges of the law in criminal cases, I should hold it my duty to
abstain from the responsibility of stating the law to
them. . . ." A study of Wilson and other founders would have
informed him that it was the judge's duty to advise the jury
on the law, but that the jury was not bound by his advice.
Story seems to be huffily protesting that if the jury is not
going to accept his word on the law as gospel, he won't give
any advice at all.
To be sure, Battiste was a case in which Justice Story had
particular reason to want the jury to adhere strictly to his
instructions. The case concerned an American sailor on an
American ship who had aided the transport of slaves between
Portuguese colonies on the coast of Africa.2 03 The question
was whether his actions violated an 1820 Congressional
statute that made it a capital crime to seize a negro or
mulatto on a foreign shore, with intent to make him a slave,
and carry him aboard a ship.2 04
Justice Story construed the statute narrowly in favor of
the accused and instructed that the defendant could not be
convicted unless he had some title or interest in, or power
over, the slaves; if he was merely transporting the slaves
under the direction of his employers, he would have to be
acquitted.205 If the jury construed the law too broadly, it
might wrongfully condemn a man to death where, in Story's
opinion, the man had not actually committed the crime in
question.2 0 6 The jury followed Story's advice and found the
defendant not guilty.207
Battiste shows that Justice Story understood and could
apply equity in his decisions. But he saw the application of
equity as a judge's role, not a jury's.20 8 In Battiste, he
203. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043-44.
204. Id. at 1044.
205. Id. at 1045.
206. But see Middlebrooks, supra note 43, at 397 ("Story's construction
effectively eviscerated the statute.").
207. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1046.
208. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 5-6
(1835-36).
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performed the jury's job of resolving law and fact
complicately, and then instructed the jury how to do the
same. Justice Story's juries may have frequently reached
credible verdicts, but they were not the verdicts of the
independent juries that the framers envisioned. Rather than
representing the conscience of the community, they
represented the conscience of Justice Story.
Oddly, the next important episode in the history of jury
independence was, like Battiste, connected to the slavery
issue.
B. Jury Independence and Fugitive Slaves
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 required law enforcement
officials everywhere to arrest anyone suspected of being a
runaway slave on the basis of a claimant's sworn testimony of
ownership.2 09 The suspected slave had no right to a jury trial,
or to testify on his own behalf, or to confront witnesses
against him.2 10 In addition, any person aiding a runaway
slave by providing food or shelter was subject to six months'
imprisonment and a $1,000 fine.211
Because would-be slave owners only needed to provide an
affidavit to a federal marshal to recapture a slave, and
because the suspected slave couldn't defend himself in
court,2 12 many free blacks were fraudulently conscripted into
slavery by slave-catchers who could easily find "claimants
ready to swear falsely to ownership, pay a bribe, and walk off
with a new slave."2 13 As Frederick Douglass said, "Under this
law the oaths of any two villains (the capturer and the
claimant) are sufficient to confine a free man to slavery for
life."214
The law outraged many in the North,2 15 particularly in
Massachusetts, which had become the center of the drive to
abolish slavery.216 Juries in Massachusetts had been
instrumental in ending slavery in the state through a series
209. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 2 MILTON MELTZER, SLAVERY: A WORLD HISTORY 225 (1993).
214. Id.
215. See generally LYDIA MARIA FRANCIS CHILD, THE DUTY OF DISOBEDIENCE
TO THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT (1850).
216. See CONRAD, supra note 27, at 75.
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of cases between 1765 and 1781 in which civil juries found in
favor of slaves who sued their masters for their freedom. 17
Massachusetts was the only state that allowed blacks to serve
on juries before the Civil War.2 18
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 provided the impetus for
perhaps the most inspiring moments in the history of jury
independence. One of these was the Morris case, briefly
described in the introduction of this article. In 1851, Fredrick
Jenkins (alias "Shadrack") was arrested in Boston as a
runaway slave. 2 19 After a court hearing, a crowd of both black
and white persons rushed into the courtroom and escorted
Shadrack to safety; he eventually made his way to Canada.220
Although President Fillmore demanded prosecution of
Shadrack's rescuers, the government could not obtain a single
conviction. 221' The government sought treason indictments,
but grand juries returned indictments charging only
misdemeanors.22 2 After two acquittals and several
deadlocked juries, the government gave up.223 One of these
acquittals was in the case of black attorney Robert Morris, in
which the defense told the jury that they "were rightfully the
judges of the law, as well as the fact; and if any of them
conscientiously believed the . . . 'Fugitive Slave Act,' to be
unconstitutional, they were bound by their oaths to disregard
any direction to the contrary which the court might give
them."224
Justice Benjamin Curtis of the Supreme Court, riding
circuit where Justice Story had once pronounced judgments,
cut off the attorney at that point and had him argue this
proposition outside the jury's presence.22 5 Curtis's
impartiality has been questioned because he attained his
position through the help of U.S. Senator Daniel Webster,
who had staked his political career on the 1850 Compromise
217. Id. at 75-76.
218. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 169 (1997).
219. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 81.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Middlebrooks, supra note 43, at 402.
223. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 81.
224. United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No.
15,815).
225. Id.
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and enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.22 6 Furthermore,
the slave commissioner from whom Shadrack had escaped
was Curtis's brother.227
After hearing attorney argument, Curtis ruled against
jury independence. His first point of reasoning was that jury
independence would lead to lack of uniformity in the law."'
This would violate the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.2 2 9 Curtis's argument presupposes that uniform
execution of the laws is more important than justice in
individual cases. Even if one excuses Justice Curtis for
upholding slavery, on the basis that he was bound to do so
under the Constitution as it then stood, one might still
question his disallowing the jury's right to cast a vote,
through its verdict, against the lack of due process inherent
in the 1850 slave law.
Curtis next argued that the Supremacy Clause bound
judges to enforce the supreme law of the land-how could it,
then, not apply to the juries whom judges must advise?230
"[W]hy was this command laid on the judges alone, who are
thus mere advisers of the jury," asked Curtis, "and may be
bound to give sound advice, but have no real power in the
matter?" 231 James Wilson provides an answer:
[I]t is incumbent on the jury to pay much regard to the
information, which they receive from the judges. But ...
[siuppose that . . . a difference of sentiment takes place
between the judges and the jury, with regard to a point of
law . . . . The jury must do their duty, and their whole
duty: they must decide the law as well as the fact. 232
Also, as Bracton had pointed out six centuries earlier,
judges should not have the last word on the law in a criminal
case because they are government employees in a case where
the government is a party.2 33 Under the U.S. Constitution,
ultimate sovereignty lies with the people. Just like
presidents and congressmen, judges are the people's servants.
226. Middlebrooks, supra note 43, at 404.
227. Id.
228. Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1332.
229. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
230. United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1332-33 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851)
(No. 15,815).
231. Id. at 1333.
232. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1000.
233. See BRACTON, supra note 14, at 119 a, b.
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It is precisely the judges' role to advise the jury on the law,
but to leave the final decision to the jurors, the
representatives of the people. The Constitution expressly
provided for local juries in order to give voice to the local
conscience.234
After a brief survey of English law, Justice Curtis
concluded, in Justice Story-like fashion, that the common law
of England did not allow jurors to decide questions of law.235
Although he cited none of the American founders' statements
on the issue, Curtis did address Brailsford. The thrust of his
argument was that the case must not have been reported
correctly:
I cannot help feeling much doubt respecting the accuracy
of this report; not only because the different parts of the
charge are in conflict with each other, but because I can
scarcely believe that the chief justice held the opinion
that, in civil cases, and this was a civil case, the jury had
the right to decide the law. Indeed the whole case is an
anomaly. It purports to be a trial by jury, in the supreme
court of the United States, of certain issues out of
chancery. And the chief justice begins by telling the jury
that the facts are all agreed, and the only question is a
matter of law, and upon that the whole court were agreed.
If it be correctly reported, I can only say, it is not in
accordance with the views of any other court, so far as I
know, in this country or in England, and is certainly not in
accordance with the course of the supreme court for many
years.236
Curtis's only rationalization for ignoring Brailsford was
that the case was not accurately reported. He gave three
reasons for believing this: (1) the report showed Chief Justice
Jay contradicting himself by saying, first, that usually judges
decide law and jurors decides fact, then saying that the jurors
might decide the law as well, if they so chose; (2) he couldn't
believe that the Chief Justice could have thought that juries
could decide the law in civil cases, as opposed to criminal; and
(3) no court in England or America had ever held such a view.
234. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . .. ."); see also A Democratic
Federalist, PENNSYLVANIA HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787 (arguing against the pre-Bill
of Rights Constitution because it abolished drawing juries from the vicinage).
235. Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1333-34.
236. Id. at 1334.
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First of all, it is no contradiction to state a general rule
while noting that the rule may have exceptions. The law has
many general rules that have exceptions.
As to Curtis's disbelief that the Court could think that
this was a rule in civil cases, his disbelief makes no sense. If
juries may not decide law in any kind of case, as Curtis
seemed to believe, then why distinguish between civil and
criminal cases? Curtis's astonishment that the Supreme
Court would allow a jury to decide the law in a civil case
implies that he considered that juries had such a right only in
criminal cases. Given that the case before him was a criminal
case, Curtis should have applied the rule and allowed the jury
to decide the law.
Finally, as to Curtis's statement that no court in England
or America ever held such a view, if he meant that no court
held such a view in any case, civil or criminal, then he was
clearly wrong.23 7 Curtis admitted as much when he said that
"there has not been an entire uniformity of opinion" as to
whether "trial by jury" meant a jury that can decide both law
and fact. 238 Curtis's statements are self-contradictory. If no
court had ever held such a view, then how could there be any
lack of uniformity of opinion?
At Morris's trial, the prosecution presented witnesses
who said they had seen Morris with Shadrack during the
rescue. 239 Nevertheless, the jury acquitted Morris.24 0
Perhaps the jurors did not find the evidence persuasive.
Perhaps they were influenced by the defense's thwarted
attempt to tell them they were judges of the law. Or perhaps
they simply followed their consciences. The Shadrack case
was not the first in which juries refused to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Such incidents happened in New
York and Pennsylvania, among other states.2 41
237. See, e.g., State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849); State v. Snow, 18 Me. 346,
348 (1841); Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462, 475 (Mass. 1826); The
Trial of John Hodges, 10 Am. St. Tr. 163, 176 (C.C.D. Md. 1815).
238. United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1332 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No.
15,815).
239. Middlebrooks, supra note 43, at 403.
240. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 80-83.
241. Id. at 80.
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C. Sparf: Taking Battiste over Brailsford
In 1895-one hundred and one years after Brailsford,
and sixty years after Battiste-the Supreme Court, in
Sparf,2 42 again considered whether juries should be judges of
both law and fact. The case involved a murder at sea.243 The
trial judge had instructed the jurors that they could not find
the defendants guilty of the lesser crime of manslaughter.2 4
The Supreme Court's opinion, written by the first Justice
Harlan, affirmed the instruction and launched into extensive
dicta24 5 on why juries must take the law from the judge.2 46
Harlan quoted approvingly from Justice Story's instruction in
Battiste,2 47 a case that represented the opinion of a single
justice riding circuit. One might think, however, that the
Court would give more weight to the opinion of a unanimous
Supreme Court during the early days of the republic, as in
Brailsford.
To get around Brailsford, the Sparf court adopted Justice
Curtis's analysis in Morris: the Court assumed that
Brailsford must have been reported incorrectly. 248 The Sparf
Court's preference for Battiste and Morris over Brailsford
indicates its lack of historical and philosophical perspective,
exactly the criticisms that historian Vernon Parrington would
later level at Justice Story.249 The Sparf majority never even
mentioned that Morris concerned the despicable fugitive slave
laws or that it represented a judicial attempt to enforce at
any cost a law that often bound formerly free people into
slavery with only a minimal semblance of due process.
To approve Morris over Brailsford, especially with the
benefit of thirty years of hindsight since the Civil War, was to
say that the positive law must be followed no matter what
moral outrages it entailed. Ironically, the Sparf Court
accelerated the ascendancy of strict legalism by pretending to
be dutifully following the rule of Morris and Battiste. In
242. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
243. Id. at 52.
244. Id. at 61 n.1.
245. The discussion was dicta because the parties had not raised or briefed
the issue. Middlebrooks, supra note 43, at 386.
246. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 64-107.
247. Id. at 73-74.
248. Id. at 65 (citing United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1334 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815)).
249. See PARRINGTON, supra note 190, at 303.
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reality, it willfully broke the rules by giving more weight to
two circuit court decisions, both indirectly supporting the
enslavement of human beings, than it did to a unanimous
Supreme Court decision.
Sparf may be the only case in which the Supreme Court
went against its own precedent on the basis that the earlier
decision was a typo. 25 0  The Court also showed little
awareness of the concepts in the right-hand column of Judge
Posner's table of legal antinomies that might soften the rigors
of strict legalism. The opinion is extremely formalistic,
striving for a mechanical application of what it assumes are
clear-cut legal rules. It posits a bright-line division of labor-
judge does law, jury does facts-without any apparent
awareness of the practical difficulties inherent in applying
law to facts, nor of the jury's historic role as defender against
government oppression. The majority opinion brings to mind
Roscoe Pound's comment that it is a mistake for courts to
believe they can reduce all things to rules. 5
The narrow holding of Sparf did little more than affirm
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could
return a verdict for a lesser offense.2 52 But the Court's
extensive dicta had the effect of banishing jury discretion
from the federal courts on the basis that, if juries didn't follow
judges' instructions on the law, it would lead to a government
of men, not of laws.253
In support of its conclusion, the Court cited numerous
instances of English and American courts insisting that juries
must follow judges' instructions on law.2 54 The Sparf
majority cherry-picked James Wilson's lecture on juries,
taking out of context his statement that jurors' deficiencies in
the law could be rectified by the judge's instructions. 25 5 The
majority chose to ignore Wilson's statement that "[tihe jury
must do their duty . .. they must decide the law as well as the
250. The dissent argued, plausibly, that there was no reason to doubt the
accuracy of the report. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 156-57 (1895)
(Gray, J., dissenting).
251. Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 708
(1913).
252. See CONRAD, supra note 27, at 106.
253. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 102-03.
254. Id. at 69-106.
255. Id. at 69.
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fact."256
And, as the dissent pointed out, the overwhelming view
of courts in the United States for forty years after the
adoption of the Constitution was that juries were judges of
both law and fact.257 Such opinions, the dissent argued, carry
far greater weight than the opinions of courts of other times
and places:
[U]pon the question of the true meaning and effect of the
constitution of the United States in this respect, opinions
expressed more than a generation after the adoption of the
constitution have far less weight than the almost
unanimous voice of earlier and nearly contemporaneous
judicial declarations and practical usage.258
Just as in Hodges and Brailsford, argued the dissent,
American judges in the early days of the republic freely
instructed juries that they were not bound by the judge's view
of the law. 2 5 9 Echoing the words of Vaughan, Pettingal, and
Wilson, the dissent noted that a jury's verdict was
"complicated of law and fact, blended together ... 260 The
dissenters fully grasped the futility of strict legalism and the
importance of equity in the decision-making process: "The
purpose of establishing trial by jury was . . . to secure
impartial justice between the government and the accused in
each case as it arose."2 6' The reference to "impartial" justice
echoes the point, made by Bracton in the thirteenth century
and by Kent in the nineteenth, that a judge may not have the
final word on the law because he is a representative of the
government.262
Unfortunately, the majority opinion seems to have
quieted the national debate on juries as judges of law and fact
for some time, even as it diminished the role of the
independent jury.
256. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1000.
257. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 168 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
258. Id. (Gray, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 163 (Gray, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 174 (Gray, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 174-75 (Gray, J., dissenting).
262. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804);
BRACTON, supra note 14, at 119 a, b.
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D. The Road to Sparf-dom
It could be argued that Sparf was inevitable. Society
changed in many ways in the years after the Revolution.
Perhaps the country no longer needed independent juries.
For one thing, the law became more complex.26 3 Courts began
seeking jurors who could be impartial blank slates, rather
than representatives of the community psyche, with all its
prejudices;26 4 with the rise of "interest politics" in the United
States, the country needed its courts to be neutral arbiters.
Ideals of due process demanded a higher degree of
predictability and uniformity in the law.16  The country's
burgeoning commercial economy also demanded certainty and
predictability in the laws of property, contract, and debtor-
creditor law.267 The concept of equal protection began to
transcend the importance of democratic rule.268 But did these
changes mean that the country needed jurors to be less
independent?
While the increased complexity of legal rules may require
a judge to give the jury additional assistance in
understanding the law, the jury still has to apply that law
complicately to a real-life situation to achieve a just outcome.
Legal complexity does not by itself remove the need for
equity, or require juries to look only at the letter and not the
spirit of the law. Indeed, when laws become so difficult to
understand that some citizens violate them without realizing
that they're doing so, juries stand as protectors of their fellow
citizens. If the commonsense reaction of most jurors is that a
law is so confusing that they wouldn't have known they were
violating it themselves, and especially if it doesn't seem to be
directed at morally repugnant actions, they may be justified
in acquitting in spite of the law and the facts.269
263. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL
OF DEMOCRACY 88 (2000).
264. Id. at 99-102.
265. See WOOD, supra note 45, at 243-70, 324-25.
266. ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at 89.
267. Middlebrooks, supra note 43, at 408 (citing WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY 1760-1830 165, 167 (1975)).
268. ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at 79, 88-90.
269. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) ("It will be of little avail to
the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice if the laws be so
voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be
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As for the concept of jurors as neutral blank slates, this
might seem a worthy ideal, but it is difficult to achieve.
Jurors are human beings with years of experience and many
ideas about what is important in life that they bring with
them into the courtroom. We should want them to bring their
consciences with them, and we hope that they will apply
whatever wisdom and sense of values they have acquired in
life. By interacting with other jurors who may have different
experiences, values, interests, and viewpoints, we hope that
they will expand their own viewpoints. In 1979, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in reversing the conviction
of a black man at whose trial all blacks had been
peremptorily excluded from the jury, argued that the solution
to our human biases is not to suppress them, but to harness
them to the dynamic exchange of viewpoints that is the
deliberative process of juries:
It is this very diversity of opinion among individuals, some
of whose concepts may well have been influenced by their
group affiliations, which is envisioned when we refer to
"diffused impartiality." No human being is wholly free of
the interests and preferences which are the product of his
cultural, family, and community experience. Nowhere is
the dynamic commingling of the ideas and biases of such
individuals more essential than inside the jury room. 270
Similarly, while due process demands clarity, uniformity,
and predictability in the law, these traits are not the law's be-
all and end-all. As Lysander Spooner said, "Few persons
could reasonably feel compensated for the arbitrary
destruction of their rights, by having the order for their
destruction made known beforehand, in terms so distinct and
unequivocal as to admit of neither mistake nor evasion."271 if
a law is unjust, it is better to have some juries refusing to
understood . . . ."). One might counter argue that certain complex laws, such as
securities laws, were meant to regulate sophisticated businesspersons, not the
average citizen. These businesspersons would be expected to understand the
law-or find out what it means-even if most jurors wouldn't understand it.
This is true, but there is no bar to a prosecutor's offering an argument to the
jury such as: "While this law seems complicated to most of us, the defendant,
who was an executive of a securities firm, had a responsibility to understand
the law and had access to skilled lawyers who could advise her. She therefore
had no excuse for violating the law."
270. Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515 (Mass. 1979) (internal
footnote omitted).
271. SPOONER, supra note 200, at 137-38.
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enforce it than to have all juries uniformly applying it.
Regarding the need for predictable laws in an expanding
commercial economy, most of the rules that affected business
were part of the civil law. Judges have gradually gained
more power to modify a civil jury's verdict when a judge
concludes that the verdict doesn't follow the law. In a civil
case, where the government is not a party, it is appropriate
for the judge to have the last word on the law because he has
no allegiance to either side.27 2 This is not so in a criminal
case, where the government prosecutes and also pays the
judge's salary.27 3
And even if equal protection transcends the importance
of democratic rule, juries are not merely instruments of
majority control. They are also, when properly representative
of the society as a whole, an important tool for protecting
minorities. This was exactly the function that juries served
when they refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act.
Independent juries can thus be the champions of equal
protection. The application of equitable principles, as the
term "equity" implies, helps to equalize fairness by
accounting for those extenuating circumstances that the
black letter law has failed to account for-the very failure
that may lead to unjust applications of the law.
Judges like Story, Curtis, and Harlan, who wrote the
opinions in, respectively, Battiste, Morris, and Sparf, saw law
as a science that could be definitively known through the
technical expertise of judges.27 4 "This 'formalistic' mode of
reasoning aspired to bring certainty and logical inexorability
to the law-clear, distinct, bright-line boundaries or
classifications that judges could apply to a case without will
or discretion." 27 5 Seeing law as a science rather than an art,
however, dehumanizes it, separates it from reality, and treats
it as an intellectual abstraction. The much wiser James
Wilson understood that fact and law could be "so closely
interwoven, that a determination of one must, at the same
272. See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185, 290 (1855) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("In a question between two of his subjects, the king or his judge was
presumed to be indifferent.").
273. See id. at 291.
274. See Middlebrooks, supra note 43, at 408-14.
275. Id. at 411.
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time, embrace the determination of the other."27 6
In short, while society did go through important changes
in the generation after the Revolution, none of these changes
altered the need for equity in the law. None of them meant
that there should be no room for discretion in the law. None
of them removed the judge's conflict of interest, as a
representative of the state, in deciding the law in criminal
cases. Nor did they remove the need for jurors to stand as
representatives of the whole society against government
oppression.
E. Jury Independence in the Twentieth Century
A few decades after Sparf, prohibition-era juries
routinely acquitted people accused of alcohol-related crimes-
the acquittal rate being as high as sixty percent in some
areas-although there do not appear to have been any
coordinated efforts to organize jury revolts against alcohol
prohibition.2n This was a case of spontaneous jury
independence doing what it is supposed to do-testing
legislative acts against the pulse of the community. The
prohibition laws failed the test and were accordingly
rescinded.27 8
In the 1940s, the phrase "jury nullification" began to
appear in the legal literature and case law,2 79 although it does
not seem to have been widely used until about the 1970s. The
first major case to use the phrase extensively was United
States v. Dougherty,280 a 1972 D.C. Circuit case involving
276. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1000.
277. See CONRAD, supra note 27, at 109.
278. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
279. See In re Schofield, 66 A.2d 675, 684 (Pa. 1949); David Riesman, Jr.,
Law and Social Science: A Report on Michael and Wechsler's Classbook On
Criminal Law and Administration, 50 YALE L.J. 636, 648 (1941). The earliest
OED reference for this usage is from H.L. Mencken's American Mercury
Magazine in 1927. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). I have
found, however, what appears to be an isolated usage of the phrase in England
as early as 1831. See EDWARD GIBBON WAKEFIELD, FACTS RELATING TO THE
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IN THE METROPOLIS (1831), quoted in GREEN, supra
note 40, at 362 (stating that judges and jurors "constantly nullify the law, by
saving from capital convictions, one whom they believe to be capitally guilty");
see also SPOONER, supra note 200, at 221 ("In this way [by disobeying unjust
laws and seeking pardon of juries] all legislation would be nullified, except the
legislation of that general nature which impartially protected the rights, and
subserved the interests, of all.").
280. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Vietnam War protesters. The majority was well aware of the
benefits of jury independence:
The pages of history shine on instances of the jury's
exercise of its prerogative to disregard uncontradicted
evidence and instructions of the judge. Most often
commended are the 18th century acquittal of Peter Zenger
of seditious libel, on the plea of Andrew Hamilton, and the
19th century acquittals in prosecutions under the fugitive
slave law.281
The Dougherty majority opinion is thus a tad less rigid
than Sparf because it recognizes the value of the jury's
occasional exercise of its discretion. Nevertheless, the
Dougherty court was wary of too much of a good thing. If
juries knew about their power, they might overuse it:
What makes for health as an occasional medicine would be
disastrous as a daily diet. The fact that there is
widespread existence of the jury's prerogative, and
approval of its existence as a "necessary counter to
casehardened judges and arbitrary prosecutors," does not
establish as an imperative that the jury must be informed
by the judge of that power.282
Rather than inform the jurors of their historic function,
the court thought it would be better to give them the usual
instruction that they must follow the law as given by the
judge. Then the jury was likely to exercise its discretion only
in cases where the facts were so compelling that the jurors
felt called on to rebel against the judge's instruction:
[I]t is pragmatically useful to structure instructions in
such wise that the jury must feel strongly about the values
involved in the case, so strongly that it must itself identify
the case as establishing a call of high conscience, and must
independently initiate and undertake an act in
contravention of the established instructions. This
requirement of independent jury conception confines the
happening of the lawless jury to the occasional instance
that does not violate, and viewed as an exception may
even enhance, the over-all normative effect of the rule of
law. 283
Chief Judge Bazelon, in dissent, criticized this theory on
281. Id. at 1130.
282. Id. at 1136.
283. Id. at 1136-37.
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the basis that the most prejudiced jurors were the ones most
likely to use their discretion spontaneously; the conscientious
juror, who would be best qualified to exercise his discretion
wisely, would be the least likely to defy the judge's
instructions.2 " Judge Bazelon went on to summarize what
may be the crux of the controversy:
I do not see any reason to assume that jurors will make
rampantly abusive use of their power. Trust in the jury is,
after all, one of the cornerstones of our entire criminal
jurisprudence, and if that trust is without foundation we
must re-examine a great deal more than just the
nullification doctrine. 2 8 5
While the Dougherty majority laid out a laudable goal-
respect for rules but with leeway for the occasional dispensing
of mercy-it suggested that the best way to reach this end
was to be less than candid with the jury about its role. Judge
Bazelon countered that "nothing is gained by the pretense
that the jurors lack the power to nullify, since that pretense
deprives them of the opportunity to hear the very instruction
that might compel them to confront their responsibility." 28 6
Judge Bazelon's comment provides a key insight into the
practical reasons for informing the jury of its power: namely,
that jurors can, and do, use this power from time to time
whether the judge tells them about it or not.28 7 Most jurors
are aware that an acquitted defendant cannot be retried.
They are also probably aware that they will not have to
explain their verdict outside the jury room. Jurors who wish
to vote for acquittal in the face of the law and the evidence
don't even have to tell other jurors their real motives; they
can say that they are voting to acquit because they have
doubts about the evidence.
Perhaps there have been cases in which all twelve jurors
believed that the accused committed the crime but, because
they believed that punishment would be unjust, all twelve
pretended to disbelieve the evidence. This is exactly what
juries have done from their earliest beginnings in order to
284. Id. at 1140 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
285. Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
286. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
287. See ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at 247 ("[H]istory indicates that we
cannot eliminate jury nullification-we can only drive it underground.").
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spare those whom the law would have treated too harshly-
distort their real view of the facts in order to make a guilty
man innocent.288
Thus, the court's pretense that jurors have no discretion
may lead to further pretending by the jurors themselves.
Judges thus take the role of stern parents, warning their
children, the jurors, that they must follow their parents'
orders to the letter. The jurors respond by pretending to obey
and then mischievously getting away with whatever they can.
We might as well return to the paternalistic days of
monarchy, when the king was viewed as everyone's father
and all his subjects were his children!"' These fictions do
nothing to increase a general respect for courts of law as
truth-seeking forums.
How much more adult and civilized it would be for judges
to inform juries frankly of their power and give them sensible
guidelines for using it. With power comes responsibility. A
jury should understand its power, but it may need guidance
on how to use that power wisely.
III. ADDRESSING ARGUMENTS FOR DISCOURAGING JURY
INDEPENDENCE
If the founders were so enthusiastic about the right to a
jury trial in criminal cases that they guaranteed it twice in
the Constitution, why has the judiciary been so anxious to
diminish the jury's power?2 90 A number of arguments have
been made against informing juries of their discretionary
power. This section will address some of them.
As a practical matter, controversies over jury
independence usually boil down to this question: Should we
inform juries of their power to exercise
independence/discretion in reaching a verdict? Few
commentators would argue that a jury should never exercise
its discretion. But quite a few, like the majority in Dougherty,
argue that we should discourage or suppress jury
independence. 29 ' Following are some of the more potent
288. See GREEN, supra note 40, at 38-41.
289. See WOOD, supra note 45, at 43-56.
290. See generally Howe, supra note 42; Middlebrooks, supra note 43;
Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury: "The Judicial Oligarchy"
Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379 (2007).
291. See, e.g., John W. Bissell, Comments on Jury Nullification, 7 CORNELL
2011] 825
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
arguments against jury independence and my responses to
them.
A. America needed jury independence when a distant king
and parliament ruled it, but now that it is governed by a
democratically elected legislature, jury independence is
unnecessary.
The Declaration of Independence chastised King George
III for "depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by
jury." Where the king and parliament were not chosen by
the people, juries were a necessary restraint on otherwise
unchecked government power. Now that our laws are made
and enforced by officials who are answerable to the people,
the theory goes, jury independence is no longer needed. 293
But the founders didn't see it that way. Even as they
were creating a government in which the people had a greater
voice than ever before, they insisted on the trial by jury. And
when they spoke of trial by jury, they meant, as I have
argued, a jury that could resolve law and fact complicately.
The founders were acutely aware of the tendency of those in
power to crave more power, and they knew that even
popularly elected institutions could become corrupt.29
Democratically chosen judges may become beholden to their
campaign contributors, and appointed judges may feel an
obligation to those who appointed them. In any event, it
creates an appearance of impropriety for a government agent
to have the final say over the outcome of a case that the
government prosecutes. The founders knew to distrust
power, and they devised numerous checks on excessive
power.2 9 5 The independent jury was one of them. 9
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (1997); Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based
Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996).
292. U.S. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776).
293. See Howe, supra note 42, at 616. See also People v. Croswell, 3 Johns.
Cas. 337, 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (Lewis, C.J.) ("In England, where the judges
are appointed by the crown . .. the reasons for extending the powers of [juries]
are certainly much stronger than with us, where the judges are, in effect,
appointed by the people themselves, and amenable to them for any
misconduct.").
294. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) ("If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary.").
295. See id.
296. See AlolL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 237
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Furthermore, while legislatures may theoretically
represent the will of the people, the legislative process allows
many chances for laws to be enacted that do not truly have
the support of society as a whole. A poll released in
November 2009 showed that only nine percent of the people
polled trusted the judgment of America's political leaders
more than the judgment of the people.297  Legislators may
trade favors to get laws passed that benefit only their
constituents, but not the rest of the state or nation.298
Influential lobbyists representing wealthy donors may put
enough pressure on legislators to pass bills that help a few
business interests at the expense of everyone else. 9 Well-
intentioned legislation, such as alcohol prohibition, may have
disastrous unintended consequences. 30 0  Legislators often do
not have time to read lengthy bills in their entirety, allowing
for ill-advised provisions, "buried" within a bill, to be passed
into law without legislators' knowledge.30 ' A few shocking
but well-publicized tragedies may lead to overly harsh
laws.30 2 When citizens vote for a candidate, they usually do
so based on a handful of key issues; they do not necessarily
(2005) (characterizing juries as a counterbalance to the power of trial judges).
297. 71% Angry at Federal Government, Up Five Points Since September,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public
content/politics/general-politics/november_2009/71_angry-at federal-governm
ent-up-five-points-sinceseptember.
298. Huma Khan, President Obama Hails Senate Health Care
Bill as Ben Nelson Jumps on Board, ABC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9381054 (reporting that part of the deal
prompting Nelson to agree to vote for the bill was that his state would "get
millions in Medicaid funds").
299. The above poll showed that seventy-one percent of those polled believed
the federal government had become a special interest group that looked out
primarily for its own interests, and sixty-eight percent believed that
government and big business worked together in ways that hurt consumers and
investors. 71% Angry at Federal Government, supra note 297.
300. See DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION
276 (2010) (noting a thirty-three percent increase in rate of murders and
assaults during Prohibition).
301. See, e.g., Edwin Mora & Adam Brickley, Congressmen Say They Didn't
Have Chance to Read Full 1,200-Page Climate Change Bill Before Vote, CNS
NEWS.COM (June 29, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/50234.
302. See, e.g., Amanda Rogers, When Worlds Collide, AMERICAN CHRONICLE
(May 31, 2007), http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?artic
leID=28315, (describing how eighteen-year-old Joshua Lunsford, the brother of
murdered sexual victim Jessica Lunsford, might receive many years in prison
and be registered as a sex offender for having consensual sex with his underage
girlfriend, due to harsh laws passed because of his sister's murder).
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foresee or approve of every vote the candidate will cast when
in office. Thus, legislation can go awry in many ways. Juries
may act as a check on legislative shortsightedness to prevent
hastily passed or vindictive legislation from wreaking havoc
on individuals' lives.
Besides, legislatures are often poor at protecting the
rights of minorities. Jim Crow laws"os and fugitive slave laws
were passed by democratically elected legislatures. And
because blacks were systematically excluded from juries at
the time, they lacked a shield that could have provided
comparatively swift relief from oppression.3 04 Lysander
Spooner said that "the trial by jury is the only institution that
gives the weaker party any veto upon the power of the
stronger ... or any guaranty against oppression."sos
As Jeffrey Abramson has said, "If jurors may never
properly decide that the specifics of a case make it unwise or
trivial to enforce the law, if jurors may never balk at
enforcing laws they believe are fundamentally unjust, then
juries become the rubber stamp of legislatures and judges,
not independent sources of democratic judgment."30 6
B. Colonial judges were often laymen, so it made sense for
jurors to fill the gaps in the judge's understanding with their
own legal knowledge. Today, the existence of trained judges
makes juror independence unnecessary.
In colonial days, jurors were often as well versed in the
law as judges, who may not have had any legal training. 307
That made it desirable for juries to be able to substitute their
view of the law for the judge's. Now, it is argued, judges are
trained in the law, so it is appropriate for jurors to follow the
judge's instruction at all times.
303. "Jim Crow laws" were passed shortly after the Civil War to keep non-
whites out of white public schools and separated from whites in public places,
on public transportation, in hotels, restrooms, and restaurants. Christopher J.
Roederer, Working the Common Law Pure: Developing the Law of Delict (Torts)
in Light of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of South Africa's Bill of Rights, 26
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 427, 463 (2009).
304. See Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification.- The Contours of a
Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 92 (1980) ("In some cases,
nullification is an essential response to majority overreaching.").
305. SPOONER, supra note 200, at 215.
306. ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at xxii.
307. Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical
View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 503 (1976).
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Again, this theory is belied by the behavior of our early
government. It would have been difficult to find a more
learned group of judges in America in 1794, or one more in
tune with the basic principles on which the new government
was founded, than the justices who sat on the Supreme Court
when Brailsford was decided. But those judges--even though
they were unanimous on the law-invited the jury to decide
the law for itself.
If "the law" were meant to be nothing but bright-line
rules, and if there were no ambiguities in applying law to
facts, then the jury might be expected to defer to the judge's
greater knowledge of the rules. But where a jury is expected
to be the conscience of the community and a safeguard
against government oppression, it will occasionally have to
diverge from the judge's instruction. The judge's admittedly
superior knowledge of black letter law does not obviate the
occasional need to stray from the written law to achieve a just
result.
C. Early American juries only had power to construe the law,
not invalidate it.
Gary J. Simson has argued that the jury's right to decide
the law, as described in Brailsford, is merely its power to
construe the law, not to "nullify" it.10 8 In other words, a jury
may disagree with a court on its interpretation of precedent
or statute,3 0 9 but the jury may not refuse to apply a law
merely because the law itself is unjust or because the
particular application would be unjust.
Simson's analysis is difficult to reconcile with Jefferson's
statement that "if the question relate to any point of public
liberty . . . the jury undertake to decide both law and fact,""'o
or Adams's opinion that a juror has a duty "to find the verdict
according to his own best understanding, judgment, and
conscience "311 Jefferson's and Adams's visions
308. Id. at 499-500, 506-07. See also David A. Pepper, Nullifying History:
Modern-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
599, 608-09 (2000).
309. See 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1002 (arguing that a jury "must
determine [legal] questions ... according to law.... [Pirecedents, and customs,
and authorities, and maxims are alike obligatory upon jurors as upon
judges. . . .").
310. JEFFERSON, supra note 148.
311. 2 ADAMS, supra note 53, at 255.
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encompass a broader power for jurors than Simson's view. A
jury would be hard-pressed to safeguard the people's liberty
in the face of, say, the fugitive slave laws, if all it could do
was quibble with the judge's reading of the statute. The jury
also has the right in such cases to find that the law is so
oppressive that it must not be followed.
Furthermore, a jury must be able to reject a particular
application of even a just law. When Supreme Court Justice
Gabriel Duvall said in the John Hodges treason trial that the
jury had the right to decide both law and fact, he could only
have meant that the jury had every right to acquit the
defendant in spite of his literal violation of the law.
Juries, such as those in the Hodges case and in fugitive
slave cases, furthered justice by safeguarding individuals
from government oppression, rather than following the strict
letter of the law. It is difficult to see how juries can fulfill
their function as the palladium of liberty and conscience of
the community if they have only the power to second-guess
the judge's parsing of a statute. A jury's resolution of law and
fact is a dynamic process that doesn't always leave the
positive law unscathed. This is as it must be if we are to
aspire to a just and equitable society.
And, in truth, when a jury resolves law and fact
complicately, it probably seldom construes a statute in the
way a court does. Twelve jurors may agree on a verdict
without agreeing on exactly what the law means. They may
discuss and argue about the meaning of a law, but in the end,
each juror combines his own understanding of the law with
his understanding of the facts to arrive at a "guilty" or "not
guilty" verdict. Once they all agree on the verdict, it doesn't
matter if they reached that outcome for different reasons.
Juries do not decide the law by itself, in the way that an
appellate court does. Juries decide the law in combination
with the facts.
D. Allowing juries to decide the law means that a
congressional statute may be enforced in some areas of the
country but not in others.s1
That jury results are not uniform around the country
may be the price we have to pay for a jury that can do justice
312. See Simson, supra note 307, at 513-14.
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in individual cases. If so, it may be worth the price. Juries in
different places may have different ideas about the purpose
and application of a law. They should be allowed to give some
deference to local norms in applying a national statute in a
country that was founded on principles of federalism-where
the law did not have to be the same everywhere, and where
juries were supposed to be drawn from their immediate
areas. 313  Federal prosecutors are not required to enforce
federal laws with a uniform emphasis from district to district.
There will always be allowances made for local needs and
customs. Jurors, as the people's representatives, should be
part of the process of deciding what enforcement is most
urgently needed in their localities.
E. Jury independence violates the "separation of powers"
doctrine by infringing on the legislature's power to make law
and the executive's power to enforce law.
Jurors act as members of the judicial branch. Therefore,
it would seem that they overstep their bounds when they
ignore a duly passed act of a legislature. Similarly, when
juries acquit because they think that prosecution is
unjustified in a particular case, they thwart the judgment of
the prosecutor, who has decided that the case is worth
pursuing. Such instances would appear to violate the
"separation of powers" doctrine.314
But, in addition to the separation of powers doctrine, we
operate under a simultaneous and conflicting doctrine called
"checks and balances," which encourages the different
branches of government to interfere with each other. 315 Thus,
the President vetoes a bill of Congress and Congress
overrides the veto. The President appoints Supreme Court
justices, the Senate approves them, and the justices respond
by declaring unconstitutional a bill passed by Congress and
signed by the President. Juries who reject a legislative act or
acquit a defendant do, in fact, act as a check on the other
branches 3 1 but only in a small way because their actions
313. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, X.
314. See Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Judicial Conference of the District of
Columbia Circuit, 145 F.R.D. 149, 178 (1993) (arguing that pardon power has
been the prerogative of executive branch, not judicial).
315. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
316. See Paul Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J.
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affect only a single case at a time. A President vetoing a bill,
or the Supreme Court striking down a law, causes more far-
reaching consequences.
When a jury of twelve ordinary citizens, coming from a
variety of occupations and positions in society, unanimously
rejects the application of a statute, it should give the
legislature pause. When jury after jury does this, as in the
days of alcohol prohibition, a legislature would have to be
very out of touch not to get the message.
F. Since police, prosecutors, and judges have discretion, juries
don't need it.
The criminal justice system has several safety valves.
Police have discretion not to arrest, prosecutors not to
prosecute, and judges to sentence leniently. With all this
discretion, why should juries have it too?"'
Perhaps the question should be, why does the
Constitution start with "We, the People," not "We, the
Government"? Akhil Amar has noted that "we have lost the
powerful and prevailing sense of 200 years ago that the
Constitution was the people's law."318 While the founders set
up an elaborate system of government, they recognized that,
ultimately, the people were sovereign.319 As Madison said, "A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
the government . ."320 The Constitution does not give rights
to the people; rather, it enumerates the specific powers the
people have delegated to the government. 321 To say that
prosecutors should have more discretion than jurors is to say
that the servant should have more power than the master.
Jurors are the only people in the criminal justice system who
do not have a career to advance, a salary to increase, or a
position of power to consolidate. As Justice Douglas once
MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 917 (1997); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the
Nullifying Jury, 93 N.W. U. L. Rev. 877, 880 (1999); Scheflin & Van Dyke,
supra note 304, at 88.
317. See Pamela Baschab, Jury Nullification: The Anti-Atticus, 65 ALA. LAW.
110, 113 (2004).
318. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1195 (1991).
319. See Alan Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168, 185-86 (1972).
320. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
321. See CONRAD, supra note 27, at 57.
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remarked, a jury is "the one governmental agency that has no
ambition."32 2 Douglas also said that "since [the jury] is of and
from the community, it gives the law an acceptance which
verdicts of judges cannot do."323 Juries represent the "whole
society"324 in a way that police, prosecutors, judges, and even
legislators,325 do not.326
It is not difficult to find instances of law enforcers
making false arrests,3 2 7 prosecutors pursuing unjust
prosecutions, 328 and legislatures making unwise or unjust
laws.3 29 Jurors are meant to be the antidote to "casehardened
judges and arbitrary prosecutors,"330 who have seen so many
cases that they begin to believe everyone is guilty. Juries
exist to protect the weak against the powerful. 3 ' Jurors will
be better able to view the case before them as if it were the
only case they ever had to decide-because for many of them,
it will be. If a jury acquits because it believes that the case
was simply not worth prosecuting, even if the defendant
technically broke the law, the prosecutor should consider this
message when exercising his discretion in the future.
322. W.O. DOUGLAS, WE, THE JUDGES 389 (1956), quoted in Scheflin & Van
Dyke, supra note 304, at 112-13.
323. Id.
324. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 958.
325. Although legislators "represent" their constituencies in the sense that
they speak for them in the legislature, they do not necessarily "represent" them
in the sense of mirroring them socially. Legislators, because of their power,
generally have a higher social status than most of their constituents.
326. See SPOONER, supra note 200, at 80-81 ("[T]he consciences of a jury are
a safer and purer tribunal than the consciences of individuals specially
appointed, and holding permanent offices.").
327. See, e.g., Pate & Brody, Civil rights lawyer successful in appeal of federal
false arrest case, GEORGIA TRIAL LAWYER BLOG (Feb. 8, 2009), http://georgia-
trial-lawyers.com/2009/02/civil rights_1awyersuccessful.html; False Arrest
Case Ends With 2 Men Receiving $1 Million Ohio Personal Injury Awards,
TOTAL INJURY BLOG (Nov. 17, 2006), http//www.totalinjury.com/blog/2006/11/.
328. See, e.g., The Trial of John Hodges, 10 Am. St. Tr. 163, 163, 169 (C.C.D.
Md. 1815); Duke lacrosse prosecutor disbarred, CNN.COM (June 17, 2007),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/16/duke.lacrosse/; Bennett Law Firm, How to
Go to Jail Without Even Trying, BAD PROSECUTORS BLOG (July 9, 2009),
http://bennettlawfirm.typepad.com/badprosecutors/ (listing the worst
prosecutors of 2008 and 2009).
329. E.g., Jim Crow laws and laws implementing alcohol prohibition.
330. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
331. See PETIINGAL, supra note 39, at v; THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 97, at 55.
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G. The law has developed affirmative defenses that make jury
independence unnecessary.
In England at one time, a person could be convicted of
homicide even though he killed in self-defense.33 2 Such a
person had to hope for a pardon from the sovereign.3
Eventually, the law developed so that self-defense was
accepted as an affirmative defense. 3 4  This allowed the
defendant to present evidence that he had acted to save his
own life and, just as important, entitled him to an instruction
from the judge that he should be acquitted if the jury believed
him.
The law has developed other theories of excuse,
justification, or mitigation that allow the jury to acquit, or
convict of a lesser offense, even though the defendant has
committed what would otherwise be a criminal act.3 1 Such
theories include duress, insanity, necessity, defense of others,
provocation, and entrapment. These defenses make jury
independence obsolete, it could be said, because they cover all
the situations that have properly led juries in the past to
acquit in the face of the law and the evidence.33 6 If one of
these defenses is appropriate, the judge will instruct the jury
on it.
But we should be wary of the illusion that we are the
generation that has at last perfected the law so that it needs
no more adjustment. As Roscoe Pound has pointed out, law
inevitably evolves more slowly than public opinion.3
Thomas Green has argued that jurors in England
distinguished between what we now call murder and
manslaughter, possibly for centuries, before the law
recognized the distinction.33 1 "Even in the most matured
legal systems," wrote Pound, "causes arise constantly for
which the rule must be made or ascertained after the
332. See Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense: What's A
Jury Got To Do With It?, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1143, 1154-56 (2009).
333. See id. at 1155.
334. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 221 (3d ed.
2001) (observing that every U.S. state recognizes self-defense).
335. See Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the
Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155 (1987).
336. See Baschab, supra note 317, at 113.
337. Pound, supra note 146, at 25-26.
338. GREEN, supra note 40, at 29-35.
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event."3 39 One may reasonably wonder when, if ever, the law
would have recognized the murder-manslaughter distinction
if jurors hadn't been applying the principle beforehand.
Let us take another look at my hypothetical B, in which
the elderly wife performed a mercy killing on her husband.34 0
She would not be helped by self-defense, duress, necessity, or
insanity defenses. Yet a jury might not want to treat her the
same as the kill-for-the-insurance-money defendant of
hypothetical A. Perhaps some day the legislature will pass a
law allowing assisted suicide in certain cases, '3 1 but the
defendant and the jury should not have to wait for that day to
do individual justice now.
H. Allowing jury independence will sidetrack trials onto
tangential issues.
Suppose a defendant trespassed onto a nuclear power
plant because he opposes such plants as unsafe. Or suppose
he trespassed on a military base in protest of the nation's
latest military intervention. Should he be allowed to explain
his reasons at trial? Might this not turn the trial into a
sideshow where nuclear power plants or the government's
foreign policy become the issue, rather than the defendant's
actions?
This may be the fear of some who believe that a
necessary effect of encouraging jury independence is that
defendants would be allowed considerable trial time to put on
evidence that their actions were justified under some common
understanding of morality. This might mean that the power
plant trespasser would present a parade of expert witnesses
on the dangers of nuclear power, while the prosecution would
have to present an opposing panel of experts.
Such fears are exaggerated. A jury in the power plant
case does not need to decide whether it favors nuclear power
plants. But it does need to know why the defendant
trespassed. If a jury believes a defendant trespassed out of
principle, then no matter whether the jury agrees with the
339. Pound, supra note 251, at 706.
340. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
341. Doctor-assisted suicide is currently allowed in three states. See Assoc.
Press, Montana 3rd State to Allow Doctor-Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/12/31/us/AP-US-
Physician-Assisted-Suicide.htmal.
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defendant, it may treat him more leniently than a defendant
who trespassed in order to rob or injure someone, or, worse,
blow up the plant. As James Wilson said, the motive is
intimately bound up with the crime.34 2 Therefore, the
defendant has a right to apprise the jury of his motive.343
This will not usually require a panel of experts.
Besides, if prosecutors are allowed, as explained in the
Supreme Court's decision in Old Chief,344 to present enough
evidence to persuade a jury that a guilty verdict is morally
reasonable, it seems only fair to allow the defendant to
counter with evidence to show that a guilty verdict would be
morally unreasonable. 3 4 5  A modem-day defendant should
have at least as many rights as a seventeenth century
defendant in England, of whom Sir Matthew Hale said, "the
defendant may give in evidence . . . not only every thing
which negatives the allegations in the indictment, but also all
matter of excuse and justification."3 4 6
L Juries who are explicitly informed of their discretion will
think that reaching a verdict is a sheer act of will.
Juries who are told that they have discretion in reaching
a verdict may think that this means they can do anything
they want-reach a verdict through caprice, whim, prejudice,
or whatever "feels right."
This is a legitimate concern because we do not seek
unbridled, arbitrary discretion. A jury should consider the
law and the facts complicately to reach a just verdict by
reconciling them. The jury may decide that the law is unjust
342. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1000-01.
343. Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and
Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 250
(1993).
344. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-89 (1997). The Court split
five to four, in a prosecution for gun possession by a convicted felon. The Court
allowed that a defendant could stipulate to the previous conviction, and thereby
preclude the government from presenting evidence of the nature of that crime.
Id. at 173. All nine justices agreed, however, that generally "the prosecution is
entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice." Id. at 186 (majority); see
also id. at 198 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the "fundamental principle that
in a criminal prosecution the Government may prove its case as it sees fit").
345. See Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts,
and Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 467, 468, 506-07 (2001).
346. 2 MATrHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 259 (1736).
Hale lived from 1609 to 1676.
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and should be ignored, or it may decide that the law cannot
be applied literally in certain situations, but it must first
consider the law. It should make an honest attempt to fit the
literal law to the facts until it finds that conscience and
justice will not allow it.
Juries need not be instructed explicitly and routinely
that they have discretion. Instead, we will make strides
toward the right balance between discretion and will if we
merely stop telling juries that they have no discretion. Most
jurors take their roles seriously and will act wisely if carefully
instructed. A well-crafted instruction should help guide the
jury's discretion when needed.34 7 I will offer specific
proposals for jury instructions in Part IV of this article.
J. Juries who are advised of their discretion are more likely to
convict wrongfully.
Our system abides by the maxim that it is better to let
ten guilty go free than convict one innocent;3 48 so a wrongful
conviction is a more serious miscarriage of justice than a
wrongful acquittal. A wrongful conviction occurs when the
evidence does not show that the defendant violated the law,
but the jury convicts because it finds his conduct ignoble or
his personality distasteful. The defendant is in effect
convicted of an ex post facto law-one concocted by the jury
on the spot with no notice to the defendant that his actions
were criminal at the time he performed them. This is a due
process violation.49
Some empirical evidence suggests that jurors who are
informed generally of their discretion are more likely to
convict wrongfully.350 This is a genuine concern, and for this
reason, as explained more fully in Part IV, I propose that the
court should not give an explicit, generalized instruction on
jury discretion (e.g., that the jury may "vote its conscience")
unless the defendant requests it.
K Jury discretion has shielded racist murderers in the past.
Juries may use their discretion to acquit under a just law
347. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 304, at 107.
348. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 352.
349. See Simson, supra note 307, at 519-20.
350. See Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: An Empirical Perspective, 28
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 425, 441-44 (2008).
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for contemptible reasons. It is widely accepted that "[cilassic
examples of bad faith jury nullification occurred throughout
the South during the civil rights movement in the sixties
where all-white juries acquitted white defendants of crimes
committed against black and white civil rights workers."351
Echoing this theme, Alan Dershowitz has referred to jury
discretion as a "redneck trick."3 52 These incidents are cited,
probably more than any others, by serious commentators who
wish to stress the dangers of jury independence.
But what is widely accepted is not always the whole
truth, as Clay Conrad has demonstrated in his analysis of
racism in jury verdicts.5 4 In many cases, the lack of
conviction was the fault of police, prosecutors, or judges who
made less-than-half-hearted attempts to bring the murderers
to justice.
Most high profile of all such racist murders was Byron de
la Beckwith's shooting of Mississippi NAACP Field Secretary
Medgar Evers in 1963.355 Beckwith was tried twice for the
murder in 1964, but both all-white juries deadlocked. 35
Those juries were not, however, presented with an open-and-
shut case: several witnesses, including police officers, said
they had seen Beckwith elsewhere on the night of the crime;
there were doubts about his ownership of the murder weapon;
some witnesses contradicted claims that his car was parked at
a restaurant near the crime scene. 35 7 The district attorney,
perhaps restrained by political ambition, mounted an
apparently sincere but unenthusiastic prosecution.358
Under these circumstances, the two deadlocked all-white
juries do not appear to have been seized with racist fervor,
but to have been genuinely torn by the conflicting evidence.
351. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, The Perils of TV Legal Punditry, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 25, 36 n.16 (1998).
352. Alan Dershowitz, Barry Employs a Redneck Trick: Jury Nullification
Ploy Appeals to Racist Instincts, BUFFALO NEWS, June 9, 1990, at C3.
353. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at 61 ("In the South especially, all-
white juries repeatedly refused to convict whites charged with murdering blacks
or civil rights workers of any race.").
354. See CONRAD, supra note 27, at 167-203.
355. Id. at 182.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 182-83. Conrad's analysis of the Beckwith case relies largely on
MARYANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF MISSISSIPPI (1995) and ADAM NOSSITER, OF
LONG MEMORY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE MURDER OF MEDGAR EVERS (1994).
358. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 183.
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All a jury can do is try to make sense of the case with which it
is presented, and, as one juror said, "There were too many
contradictions in the thing."*3 " Beckwith was retried 30 years
later and finally convicted.s3o
Collie Leroy Wilkins, who murdered civil rights worker
Viola Liuzzo, was acquitted by an Alabama jury, but only
after the jury in his first trial could not reach a verdict.36 '
Later, Wilkins was tried and convicted of civil rights
violations,3 62 including Liuzzo's murder, by an Alabama jury
in a federal court.363
In a 1965 case in Alabama, Tom Coleman shot Jonathan
Daniel, an unarmed young seminarian and civil rights
worker, with a shotgun, killing him instantly.3 6 Coleman
pleaded that Daniels and his companion, a Catholic priest
(who was wounded but survived), had threatened him and
that both were armed.3 65  This was highly implausible,
considering that Daniels had just been released from jail,
where he had spent six days for participating in a civil rights
demonstration.3 66 Police never found the alleged weapons,
and Coleman claimed that two black teenagers took them
before the police arrived.
Most of the blame for Coleman's acquittal must lie with
the court and the prosecution. Coleman's "trial" was a farce.
The Grand Jury indicted him for manslaughter rather than
murder.3 6' The judge refused to postpone the trial, even
though the prosecution was not ready and the priest was not
well enough to testify.3 6 9 The prosecution practically gave the
case to the defense by "conceding" that the victim had
brandished a knife at Coleman, even though no witnesses had
359. Id.
360. Id. at 182.
361. Id. at 183.
362. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (criminalizing conspiracy "to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same").
363. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 186. See also Wilkins v. United States, 376
F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967).
364. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 183-84.
365. Id. at 183.
366. Id. at 183-85.
367. Id. at 184.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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testified to that effect. 3 70 In closing argument, the prosecutor
apologized to the jury for bringing the case to trial.3 ' After
the "not guilty" verdict was announced, one of the jurors
reportedly remarked that he and the defendant would now be
able to do some bird hunting together.37 2 So much for the
court's ensuring an impartial jury!
A different approach by the court and prosecution,
however, might have led to different results. When the Ku
Klux Klan murdered three civil rights workers near
Philadelphia, Mississippi in 1964, the murderers were never
prosecuted in state court. 3 Instead, they were criminally
prosecuted in federal court for conspiring to violate the civil
rights of their victims. 3 74 When, during the trial, a defense
attorney made a viciously racist remark to a black minister
on the witness stand, the judge, despite his own lack of
enthusiasm for civil rights litigation, cautioned the attorney
that he would not allow him to make a farce of the trial.3 75
Ultimately, an all-white Mississippi jury voted to convict.376
Even in the acquittal of the brutal murderers of Emmett
Till, a fifteen-year-old black boy whose chief offense was to
whistle at a white woman, the local sheriff, Harold Strider,
initially seemed eager to prosecute the murderers.7 Later,
he became a witness for the defense and speculated that the
whole incident might have been an NAACP plot to discredit
the state of Mississippi.378
Unjust race-based acquittals in the South represented a
moral breakdown in the society that infected the entire
criminal justice system, not just juries. In fact, a closer look
at the cases shows that the jurors often behaved more
honorably than police, prosecutors, and judges. And it shows
that when these state actors took their jobs seriously, the
jurors did also.
Those juries that wrongfully acquitted for racist reasons
were not proper juries under the Constitution because the
370. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 184-85.
371. Id. at 185.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 185-86.
374. Id. at 186.
375. Id.
376. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 186.
377. KENNEDY, supra note 218, at 60-61.
378. Id. at 61.
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courts violated the Fourteenth Amendment by systematically
excluding blacks. The problem was not that juries had
discretion, but that juries didn't truly represent the whole
society. Indeed, if jurors are racist enough, they may acquit
racist murderers no matter how sternly the judge warns them
that they must follow the letter of the law.
The best defense against racist juries is to make juries
open to all races. When all segments of society have a chance
to be represented, it is less likely that one segment will be
able to deny justice to others. Today's juries are more
representative than in the past, due in part to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Batson 3 9 and its progeny, which seek to
discourage race-based peremptory challenges. We should
strongly consider eliminating the peremptory challenge
altogether, as it may still be the most effective tool for
masking racial discrimination in jury selection.38
Jurors are human and, from time to time, they allow
ignoble human impulses to distort their judgments. But
jurors do not usually divide along racial lines, and race by
itself is not a good predictor of a juror's verdict. 81 When we
look at the overall records of other government actors with
discretion over the liberty of citizens, it can be argued that
juries have been, on the whole, the most trustworthy. David
Baldus's highly respected statistical analysis of the racial
disparities involved in imposing the death penalty shows that
prosecutors are far more responsible for such disparities than
juries.382
It is easier for an individual to decide on his own to
violate another's rights than for a group of twelve to agree
unanimously to commit a moral outrage. We do not cry out
for an end to prosecutorial discretion when a few prosecutors
abuse the privilege, and we should not try to take away jury
independence because a few juries behave irresponsibly.
379. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1989) (prohibiting race-based
peremptory challenges to prospective jurors).
380. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at 131-39; KENNEDY, supra note
218, at 229.
381. ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at xi.
382. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 221 (citing DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 327
(1990)).
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L. Jury independence creates disrespect for the rule of law.
Unbridled jury discretion-that is, juries acting on sheer
will or animus-may indeed create disrespect for law. But a
mechanically applied law that shows no sense of humanity or
justice may just as readily create disrespect for the law.38 1
John Henry Wigmore, the great evidence scholar, echoing
Aristotle, noted that:
Law and justice are from time to time inevitably in
conflict.... We want justice, and we think we are going to
get it through "the law", and when we do not, we blame
"the law."
Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the
privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to
the justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of
inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular satisfaction
is preserved ....
That is what the jury trial does. It supplies that flexibility
of legal rules which is essential to justice and popular
contentment.384
If our jury instructions reflect the right balance between
rule and discretion, we may be able to achieve the greatest
respect for law.
M. Juries who are apprised of their power will abuse it.
Most of the empirical evidence that we have on how
juries behave suggests that they are usually conscientious
and, often, very astute." Kalven and Zeisel's classic study of
jury behavior concluded that, for the most part, juries
understand the case and follow the evidence. 8 Studies
383. See Scheflin, supra note 319, at 183; ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at 247
("[W]e impoverish jury deliberations by providing jurors with an overly
mechanistic description of their function.").
384. John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC. 166, 169-71 (1929).
385. See, e.g., David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court
Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89,
111-22 (1995); Finkel, supra note 172, at 670 (finding underlying sense and
sophistication in juries' commonsense judgments as compared to "simplism" of
law); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A
Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78
CI.-KENT L. REV. 1249 (2003).
386. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149-62
(1966).
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suggest that explicit instructions sanctioning jury discretion
appear to increase its occurrence, but such instructions do not
seem to change the jury's verdicts where strict application of
the law would seem appropriate.3 8 ' Additionally, such
instructions "do not appear to accentuate or exaggerate
preexisting juror biases."3 A poll of judges in Maryland,
where courts have routinely given instructions on jury
discretion, indicates that the instruction does not affect most
cases.38 9  This is as it should be. Juries will find that the
literal interpretation of the law works well most of the time.
As Clay Conrad has said, "Jury independence is a doctrine of
lenity, not of anarchy."3 9 0
N. Juries are not accountable to anyone.
In the criminal justice system, someone has to have the
last word on a defendant's fate. Our democratic process
decrees that "only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or
his life."391' Let us go back to James Wilson's justification for
the jury:
If there must be, in every political society, an absolute and
discretionary power over even the lives of the citizens; let
the operation of that power be such, as would be
sanctioned by unanimous and universal approbation.
Suppose then, that, in pursuing this train of thought, we
assume the following position-that the evidence, upon
which a citizen is condemned, should be such as would
govern the judgment of the whole society. 392
A unanimous jury of twelve thus stands as the proxy for
the "whole society." And certainly the jurors are accountable
to each other. Because they are a group of the "many," as
Pettingal noted,393 the jury lacks the ability of the dictator to
act on whim. Anyone who has ever tried to get four or five
387. Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological
Perspectives, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1207, 1248 (2001).
388. Id.
389. See generally Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Right to Disagree: Judges, Juries,
and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q.
571 (1976).
390. CONRAD, supra note 27, at 143. See also ABRAMSON, supra note 263, at
xxii ("[Jiurors should exercise their power to nullify reluctantly.").
391. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
392. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 958.
393. PETTINGAL, supra note 39, at 3.
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people to agree on anything can only imagine what it is like
to get twelve to agree. In a group of twelve there will likely
be at least one person to challenge the consensus on almost
any point, unless that point is so clear as to be obvious to all.
The jurors will have to share their recollections of the
evidence and piece it all together until they understand, as a
group, what happened. They are not likely to acquit a violent
criminal if it has been fully proved that he committed a crime.
And, as Judge Jack Weinstein has said, it is unlikely that
twelve people from the community will agree to ignore a just
law.394
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR ACHIEVING THE RIGHT BALANCE OF
RULE AND DISCRETION IN JURY DELIBERATIONS
While prospective jurors may begin jury duty with
preconceived ideas about their role, they tend to take
seriously the instructions the court gives them. Our culture
has taught jurors to respect, and even fear, the power of the
man or woman with the gavel and black robe, sitting at an
elevation a foot or two above others in the room. The room is
usually arranged so as to make the judge's position the focal
point, even over that of testifying witnesses. Modern juries
are probably more deferential to judges than colonial and
post-Revolutionary juries would have been. We must be
careful, then, that the instructions we give juries do not bind
them so severely that they believe they have no room for
discretion. On the other hand, a jury should not believe it has
free rein to indulge its whims and prejudices.
The problem is analogous to those that arise in deciding
what evidence may be presented to a jury. Over the
centuries, we have created an elaborate system to prevent the
jury from being distracted by evidence that is irrelevant,
misleading, prejudicial, cumulative, unreliable, or illegally
obtained. We do not have or need such a complex structure
for rules about jury independence, but we do need to be as
thoughtful about our goals and instructions regarding jury
independence as we are about our rules of evidence. We must
help the jury find the right balance between rule and
discretion.
394. Weinstein, supra note 343, at 244.
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A. Modern-day Jury Instructions
Many of the instructions jurors receive today read as if
Justice Story had written them. They are tilted too far
toward the strict enforcement of rules, with no room for jury
discretion. For example, Florida Standard Jury Instructions
inform jurors, as a preliminary matter, who decides law and
who decides facts:
It is the judge's responsibility to decide which laws apply
to this case and to explain those laws to you. It is your
responsibility to decide what the facts of this case may be,
and to apply the law to those facts. Thus, the province of
the jury and the province of the court are well defined, and
they do not overlap.s39
When the jury is about to deliberate, it is told that failure
to follow the law as instructed will result in an injustice:
You must follow the law as it is set out in these
instructions. If you fail to follow the law, your verdict will
be a miscarriage of justice. There is no reason for failing
to follow the law in this case. All of us are depending upon
you to make a wise and legal decision in this matter. 396
The last word of the judge to the jurors is another
reminder that they must follow the law, whether they like it
or not, and suggests that this has always been the practice in
this country:
In closing, let me remind you that it is important that you
follow the law spelled out in these instructions in deciding
your verdict. There are no other laws that apply to this
case. Even if you do not like the laws that must be
applied, you must use them. For two centuries we have
lived by the constitution and the law. No juror has the
right to violate rules we all share.397
While pattern jury instructions of other states do not
drive home this message as relentlessly as the Florida
instructions, they make the point all the same. In
Massachusetts, where juries of an earlier era refused to
convict violators of the fugitive slave laws, a jury instruction
explains: "It is your duty as jurors to accept the law as I state
it to you. . . . You must follow the law as I give it to you
395. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 2.1 (2007).
396. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.10 (2007).
397. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.13 (2007).
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whether you agree with it or not."9 8  Inexplicably, the
advisory comments on this instruction cite Brailsford as an
authority, not mentioning that the Court in Brailsford went
on to tell the jury that it could decide both law and fact if it
chose.39 9  And just in case those rebellious Massachusetts
juries don't get the point, a "Supplemental Instruction,"
apparently channeling Justice Curtis, commands:
You must take the law as I give it to you. You should not
be concerned about the wisdom of any rule of law that I
give you. Whatever your private opinions about what the
law is or ought to be, it is your duty to base your verdict on
the law as I define it to you. 40 0
B. Finding the Right Balance
The effect of such Sparf-like instructions is to teach the
jury that law is a set of strict, unvarying rules, to which they,
as mere fact-finders and nothing more, are to apply the facts
they find. I believe that the balance between rule and
discretion must weigh heavily, but not completely, in favor of
rules. I don't suggest telling juries that they are judges of
both law and fact-modern juries would be confused by such
an instruction-but I do suggest that we refrain from tying
the jury's hands so tightly. A more James Wilson-like
instruction regarding who decides fact and who decides law
might read something like this:
It is your duty to determine the facts of the case. It is my
duty to advise you on the law. Once you determine the
facts, you must carefully weigh together the facts and the
law, and resolve, unanimously among yourselves, the
ultimate question of whether the defendant is, on the
whole, guilty, or not guilty, of the crime[s] with which he
is charged.
If, and only if, the state has proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, every element of a crime, may you convict the
defendant of that crime. If the state has not proved every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your
duty under the Constitution to find him not guilty.
Such an instruction would enable a jury to perform its
398. Mass. Crim. Model Jury Instr. 2.100 (2009).
399. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794).
400. Mass. Crim. Model Jury Instr. 2.100 (2009).
[Vol:51846
THE INDEPENDENT JURY
historic function as conscience of the community and
palladium of liberty without encouraging it to diverge from
the letter of the law, except in rare cases. Saying that the
judge will "advise" on the law, rather than "instruct,"
correctly suggests that the judge's advice on the law is not
binding on the jury, as Jefferson,401 Wilson,402 Hamilton,103
Adams, 404  and the Brailsford Court 0 . understood. The
instruction does not, however, minimize the judge's view of
the law by saying that it is "merely" advisory. The
instruction does not say that the jurors may stray from the
judge's advice, but it doesn't tell them that they must rigidly
follow it either.4 0 6 Rather, it leaves open the question of how
the jury will "weigh together" the facts and the law and how
it will "resolve . . . on the whole" the question of the
defendant's "guilt"-a term with moral, as well as legal,
connotations. 407 The instruction emphasizes (by invoking the
jurors' constitutional duty) the necessity of acquittal when the
state has not proved its case, but suggests (by using the word
"may") that a conviction is not absolutely mandatory even
when all the elements have been proved.
In most cases, the jurors will have such deference toward
the judge that they will not think of questioning her advice on
the law. But if the jury feels strongly that a guilty verdict
would work an injustice, the instruction allows enough
leeway for an acquittal.
401. Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, 1816. ME 15:35 ("The juries
[are] our judges . .. of law when they choose it.").
402. 2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 1000 ("Suppose that ... a difference of
sentiment takes place between the judges and the jury, with regard to a point of
law . .. . The jury . .. must decide the law as well as the fact.").
403. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 361-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804)
("[Tihe jury . .. are intrusted with the power of deciding both law and fact ....
The courts are the constitutional advisers of the jury, in matters of law . . . .").
404. 2 ADAMS, supra note 53, at 255 ("It is not only [the juror's] right but his
duty ... to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment,
and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.").
405. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) ("[Y]ou [the jury] have . . . a
right ... to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.").
406. See Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and
the Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 991-93 (2006) (proposing that
jury instructions refrain from instructing jurors that they must follow the law
regardless of conscience).
407. See SPOONER, supra note 200, at 178 ("Guilt is a personal quality of the
actor,-not necessarily involved in the act, but depending also upon the intent
or motive with which the act was done.").
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Almost as important as what the instruction says is what
it doesn't say-that the judge alone decides the law, that the
jury must follow the judge's instruction on the law, that the
jurors must follow the law whether they agree with it or not,
and that failing to follow the judge's instruction is a
miscarriage of justice. Such instructions should be discarded,
as too restrictive of a jury's historical role.
Furthermore, the principle of not forbidding jury
discretion must be applied to every step of the trial, from the
moment the prospective jurors set foot in the courtroom. The
judge and the attorneys should not tell the panel during voir
dire that the jurors must follow the judge's instruction on the
law or must enforce a law that it believes is unjust. To be
fair, defense counsel should not be allowed to tell the jurors at
that stage that they don't have to follow the substantive law
or the judge's instructions if they disagree.
Along the same lines, jurors should not be asked if they
disagree with the applicable statute; their political beliefs
should not disqualify them from serving on a jury.4 08 Jurors
should not be struck for cause for indicating that they
disagree with the substantive law or might not follow the
judge's instruction on the law. Once the trial has begun, no
juror should be removed for indicating that she may exercise
her discretion to acquit in the face of the judge's instructions.
In most cases, an instruction explicitly informing the jury
of its discretionary powers will not be necessary, as long as
the jury is not told that it has no discretion. But we should
have a special instruction for those cases where the justice of
the law, or the justice of its application, is a central issue of
the trial. When this happens, it is better to get the subject
out in the open than compel the defense to argue covertly for
jury discretion with subtle pleas for sympathy.4 0 9 Instead,
and only at the defendant's request, the court should give an
instruction along these lines:
408. See "Theophrastus," A Short History of the Trial by Jury, WORCESTER
MAGAZINE, Oct. 1787, in 1 AmERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE
FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, 693-98 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz
eds., 1983) (arguing that excluding from juries those who supported Shays'
Rebellion was to "pack" the jury).
409. See Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the
Bench and Bar, 173 MIL. L. REv. 68, 71 (2002) (arguing that when trial judges
disallow explicit argument on jury discretion, they drive such arguments
"underground").
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The defendant admits that he has committed the acts for
which he has been charged. It is therefore your right to
convict him. But a jury also has the right, in rare cases, to
acquit a defendant, or convict him of a lesser crime, when
the defendant has violated the letter of the law but the
jury believes that conviction would offend the community's
sense of justice. A jury should not exercise this discretion
lightly or because of dislike, hatred, prejudice, or ill will
toward any victim[s] of the crime, but only when
punishing the defendant would not serve any of the ends
of justice.
The instruction, which one might call a "verdict according
to conscience" instruction, purposely leaves undefined the
phrases, "the community's sense of justice" and "the ends of
justice," as their meanings should be left to the jury's
understanding. In essence, this instruction would work in
the same way as an affirmative defense: the defendant
stipulates to having committed the elements of the crime, but
is allowed to argue that the circumstances justify, excuse, or
mitigate the crime. It is somewhat like arguing for an as-yet-
uncodified affirmative defense.41 0 The defendant should have
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence supporting his
defense. This instruction recognizes, as Aristotle did, that the
law can't anticipate every factual situation, and, as Roscoe
Pound observed, that society is always evolving ahead of the
law.
Because this instruction requires the defendant to admit
to the crime and throw himself on the mercy of the jury, he is
unlikely to request the instruction unless he has a compelling
justification. The average armed robber, for example, would
probably fare better with a jury by arguing misidentification
than by pleading that he robbed to feed his starving children.
A jury's common sense would tell it that the robber should
have panhandled or applied for food stamps, rather than
threaten ordinary citizens with a dangerous weapon.
The instruction does not explicitly say that a jury may
acquit if it disagrees with the law itself. It would be
unseemly for a court, charged with upholding the law, to
inform a jury that it may, literally, go against the law. But a
410. Cf Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV.
253, 311-16 (1996) (arguing for treating "nullification" as an affirmative
defense).
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jury will probably decide that a conviction for violating what
it considers to be an unjust law would not serve the "ends of
justice." The defense should not be allowed to argue explicitly
that the law is unjust unless the defendant has requested
such a "verdict according to conscience" instruction.
Imagine an 1850s jury in a fugitive slave case being told
that it could acquit if "conviction would offend the
community's sense of justice." Such a jury could have
acquitted without the uneasy feeling that it was doing
something underhanded.
Such an instruction would allow for spirited arguments
from both prosecution and defense about the nature of law,
justice, and mercy. The defense can stress the facts that
counsel mercy, and the prosecution can caution against
minimizing the rule of law. The two sides can argue about
whether the case before them is the kind that calls for
leniency. Since the subject of jury independence is being
openly discussed and debated at trial, it will probably be clear
to most observers why the jury acquitted. This will give us
valuable information about the sentiments of the community
on a particular issue. It will allow jurors to engage in what
Judge Posner calls "the art of governance"4 1 ' with a more
responsible role to play in the administration of the law.
C. Don't Fight Jury Independence-Guide It
A modern-day judge has recently written about her
frustration with a black juror who, against the wishes of the
other jurors, refused to convict a black defendant on drug
charges because he believed the state's drug laws, as written
and enforced, were unfair to blacks. 4 12  The judge had no
recourse but to declare a mistrial. 4 13 The judge's article offers
advice to other judges about how to combat jury
independence, and argues that jurors don't need discretion
because others in the system, such as prosecutors, have it.4 14
The judge proclaims that "lj]ustice . . . is not about bending
the rules,"4 '' but never explains why prosecutors may bend
the rules but jurors may not. Perhaps she has forgotten that
411. POSNER, supra note 153, at 163.
412. Baschab, supra note 317, at 111.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 113.
415. Id. at 114.
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individual justice is the real goal, and that rules are only a
means to that end.416 She notes that in some states the judge
would have been allowed to replace the stubborn juror with
an alternate.417
Completely lost on the judge is any comprehension of
what the recalcitrant juror was protesting. Drug prohibition
laws and their enforcement have been criticized for their
disparate impact on blacks.41 8 Paul Butler, a black law
professor, has urged blacks to do exactly what this juror was
doing-get on a jury and vote to acquit black defendants
accused of non-violent drug crimes.41 9 The war on drugs has
become a festering wound in this country's racial psyche, but
the judge does not allow the significance of the black juror's
act of protest to pierce her radar screen. She equates the
juror's act with that of racist juries who acquitted murderers
of blacks,420 when a more apt comparison would be to the
jurors who protected minorities by refusing to enforce the
fugitive slave laws that oppressed black people.
Perhaps the judge has forgotten that juries are the
conscience of the community and the safeguard of liberty-
that only the jury can strip away a person's liberty. Perhaps
she does not believe that juries have a role in protecting the
weak against the mighty. If she did, she might be less
inclined to see such jurors as "troublesome restraints upon
416. As Justice Brennan said, "[tihe law is not an end to itself, nor does it
provide ends; it is preeminently a means to serve what we think is right."
CONRAD, supra note 27, at 297.
417. Baschab, supra note 317, at 114.
418. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 218, at 351.
419. See generally Butler, supra note 161. Professor Butler has been
criticized on the grounds that his theories (1) racialize the jurors' role, and (2)
would lead to jurors' arriving at the courthouse with their minds already made
up. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 218, at 295-310; Leipold, supra note 291, at
135-41; Marder, supra note 316, at 936-43. Butler seems to have modified or
clarified some of his positions in his latest book. See PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET
FREE: A HIP-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 57-78 (2009). For example, Butler notes
that strategic nullification should help free those people, regardless of race or
ethnicity, for whom imprisonment would not benefit society. Id. at 72. He
states that nullification would be inappropriate, for example, in cases in which
dealers sell drugs to minors. Id. at 70. I agree with Butler's basic insight that
it is a function of juries to protect minorities (or anyone else, for that matter)
from oppression. If Butler is simply saying that juries should weigh the law and
the facts complicately in each case before them to come to a just verdict (and
noting that in many cases this would lead to acquittals of persons who
committed minor drug possession crimes), I have no disagreement with him.
420. Baschab, supra note 317, at 113-14.
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our rulers"421 and be more willing to listen to the message
they are sending to those in power.
CONCLUSION
Even more important than allowing juries to
communicate public sentiments to the powerful, an enhanced
recognition of jury independence may revive jurors'
enthusiasm for the law, once they realize that they have a
greater role to play than that of mere fact-finder. Citizens
who are called to jury duty may respond with greater alacrity
as they become aware of the higher sense of trust that now
greets their efforts.
The right to a jury trial, by a jury that resolves the law
and facts complicately and has discretion to do justice, is both
the defendant's right and the community's right. The benefits
to the defendant are more immediately obvious. 42 2 But, in the
long run, restoring the jury to its original role as the
conscience of the community is also likely to lift the spirit of
the community as a whole. And perhaps more importantly,
strengthening jury independence may help restore "We, the
People," generally, to our rightful place as sources of the law,
rather than its mere objects.
421. Letter, supra note 1.
422. See Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control
Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 835 (1993) (arguing that juries' rights are
based on defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
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